Group Representation in European Armed Forces

Gwyn Harries-Jenkins

University of Hull

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Gwyn Harries-Jenkins (University of Hull)

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Institute of Education
University of Hull
HULL HU6 7RX
United Kingdom

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The trends toward the establishment of systems of group representation within Western Armed Forces has raised three important questions. First, to what extent can the European experience be identified as a valid analogue for the military forces of those other countries in which such representation is at present illegal? Second, to what extent can the systems of group representation be equated with conventionally defined trade unions? Third, what is the effect of such systems of representation upon the combat effectiveness of armed forces? A review of the existing European situation indicates that, with the possible exception of Sweden, none of the established systems can be equated with unionization. The systems can at best be defined as forms of personal associations in which the primary interest of the body is to protect its member.

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PREFACE

This final report was prepared by an international research team of social scientists during 1977-79 with the support of the European Research Office of the US Army without whose advice and assistance the project could not have been undertaken.

The research team comprised :

Gwyn Harries-Jenkins	University of Hull	Director of Project
Victor Werner	University of Brussels	
Bernard Fleckenstein	F D R	
Jacques Van Doorn	University of Rotterdam	
Steen Borup-Nielsen	Denmark	
Dennis Bignell	University of Hull	
Morris Janowitz	University of Chicago	Research Consultant
Anne Moran	University of Hull	Secretary

INTRODUCTION

A growing concern with the consequences for armed forces in western society of establishing some form of military unionism is evidenced in a number of publications.[1]   Scholarly monographs and 'in-house' reports increasingly concern   themselves with the analysis of what is seen as a new phenomenon in military organization. Similarly, articles on the unionization of the military appear frequently not only in the national quality press but   also in local newspapers and popular magazines.   These publications represent a wide range of theoretical constructs, the variety of adopted approaches reflecting personal attitudes to the postulated advantages and disadvantages of such unionization.   Concomitantly, the presented theory is supplemented by a rich and varied collection of empirical evidence which draws heavily on the experience of those European countries in which group representation within armed forces is a reality and not a possibility.[2]

A review of this literature suggests that there are three main themes of interest.   In the first of these, analysts are concerned with the issue of effectiveness.   Here, the focal point of attention is the question of the extent to which the spread of unionization affects not only combat capability but also the very organizational effectiveness of armed forces.   Discussion of this theme reflects a variety of perceptions.   Cortright, for example, suggests that much of the discussion in this area 'has been marked by hyperbole and exaggeration'. He writes:[3]

> Cries about strikes in the foxholes have blurred
> the real issues and distorted reality.   The dominant
> voices in the debate have been the professional
> military associations and conservative organizations.
> As a result, the discussion has concentrated on
> supposed danger to military effectiveness while
> ignoring the larger dimensions of the question.

Such a conclusion clearly represents a value judgement which is indicative of one school of thought.   Conversely, it can be argued that since the military is a purposive crisis-oriented organization, reaction to proposed innovations - not merely to the issue of unionization -

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is often a logical reflection of a concern with the effect of change upon established organizational purpose. Alternatively it can be suggested that this concern is an expression of a professional sense of commitment and responsibility, a sense which is particularly well developed in the military where there is an almost total fusion of organization and and profession.

At the same time, the conclusion advanced by Cortright draws attention to the second area of interest. This can be summarized as the issue of equality. The underlying premise is that it is in some way 'socially unjust' or 'undemocratic' if members of the military organization are denied that access to a form of group representation designed to protect their interests which is guaranteed to other workers by national and international law. Carried further, the quality thesis draws special attention to the fairness or otherwise of policies which deny to military personnel the right of belonging to a labour union formed for the purpose of advancing members' interests in respect to wages and working conditions.

Again, any reached conclusion must reflect individual attitudes and perceptions. To some analysts, the social or constitutional rights of military personnel must yield to the unique role of the military. This conclusion is most clearly stated by Cocklin:[4]

> The need for discipline, obedience and unswerving
> loyalty is an absolute military necessity. These
> precepts could be seriously eroded were military
> personnel permitted to join servicemen's unions.
> By finding the needs of the military to be paramount
> this situation need never arise.

The counter-argument, however, restates the principles of social and political justice and also stresses the seemingly different attitudes adopted in other Western European nation-states where personnel have been permitted, if not encouraged, to join military trade unions.

The third area of interest is, in a sense, a development of this. Here the primary concern is with the effect of military unionization upon the political control of armed forces in the modern state. Once

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more, two conflicting conclusions can be identified. On the one hand, it is argued that the eventual impact of military unions will be a challenge to the long established principle of civilian control. Hallenbeck in a systemic analysis of this point thus argues that unionization of military personnel would significantly alter the civil-military status quo in the United States. He writes : [5]

> Military unions - if and when they become operative - would institutionalize the organization of military personnel for interest group behaviour, imparting to that behaviour a legitimacy that it has heretofore been vigorously denied. The principle of a priori subordination to authority would be divested of its sacredness.

In other words, the already fragile and complex pattern of civil-military relationship in which the legitimacy of civilian control of the military is derived from a system of mutual obligations involving two parties would be upset if a third party - the military union - were to be introduced into the dialogue.

An alternative point of view, however, stresses that civilian control of the military will be enhanced through the formation of such unions . The underlying philosophy in this instance is analogous to the arguments of those German military unionists who stress that a soldier will be more willing and capable of defending democracy if he has an opportunity to practice democracy in his life. The basic thesis is that in a democratic country, any army which rejects the concept of democratic thought is a threat to democracy. [6] This perception repeatedly stresses that it is an isolated military, the norms and practices of which are at variance with those of the parent society, which poses the greatest threat to the principle of the subordination of the armed forces to civilian control.

In considering further these three areas of interest, it can be seen that no consensus of opinion can be identified. We are still left with the unresolved questions of the impact of unionization upon military effectiveness. The dilemma of balancing the principles of social justice with the needs of the military organization remains unresolved. The

problem of ensuring effective subordination of armed forces to the civil power continues to be an issue of critical concern.

At the same time, attempts which are made to analyse more fully the dimensions of these problems in the context of a demand for, or a trend towards, some form of group representation within armed forces are very much affected by an interpretation of the available empirical evidence. A persistent feature of this evidence is that it is almost exclusively derived from Western European experience. The supporters and opponents of military unionism repeatedly refer to European unions for evidence to support the arguments and conclusions which they put forward. Senator Thurmond comments in the Congressional Record, for example, that [7]

> Unionization in the armed forces of the Netherlands,
> Sweden, and Austria has been, to put it mildly, an
> unhappy experience when viewed in the context of an
> effective defense force.

At the same time, the Senator endorsed the point put forward in a Newsweek article of March 1976 that 'unionization is eroding the effectiveness of the defense of Western Europe'.

Equally, proponents of the benefits of military unionization draw evidence to support their thesis from such European experience. At one level, such evidence, as has been noted, emphasizes the 'democratic' nature of the European military unions. Comparative analysis has in particular, drawn attention to the manner in which forms of group representation in West Germany have reinforced the principle of 'the citizen in uniform'. [8] At a second level, the success achieved by such unions in improving considerably military compensation and conditions of service is proferred as one of the positive advantages of military unionism. At yet another level, attempts to improve the quality of organizational life in the military - to humanize work - are validated through reference to the personnel policies of these European forces in which military unionism exists. In particular, the Danish and Swedish experience is seen as a model for increasing organizational effectiveness and meeting the individual social needs of members of the armed forces. [9]

Concern with the relevance of European experience to the study of possible military unionization in the United States or the United Kingdom is thus a further area of consistent interest. Yet the comparative analysis implicit in such a study generates a complex set of conceptual and methodological problems. One of the major problems has been cogently examined by Taylor in an analysis of the extent to which the European experience _is_ a valid analogue for the United States. He concludes that cultural and political differences are so acute that these, in conjunction with significant organizational variations, weaken considerably the utility of using Western European experience as a model for developments in the American context. [10] In other words, although European experience is not totally irrelevant, it is highly inadvisable to rely on such experience as empirical evidence to support or reject proposals made in the United States or United Kingdom in the field of military unionization.

The standpoint adopted in this study, however, differs slightly from this conclusion. Whilst it is accepted that European experience is no direct analogue for the military in the United States or the United Kingdom, it is considered that the very diversity of the European model or, indeed, the absence of a single model , merits further analysis. Such a conclusion can be rationalized in a number of ways :

    1. Preliminary analysis of this European experience suggests that there is very little evidence of established forms of _unionism_ within national armed forces. In comparison with the structures which have been set up within economic organizations in Western industrialized society, established 'unions' within the military may be better described as forms of _group military representation._ Further analysis of these structures is therefore a precondition of any subsequent evaluation of European experience or of any attempt to relate such experience to American or British all-volunteer forces. (AVF)

    2. An examination of the practices and policies of these European systems of group representation in the military is of equal importance. Notwithstanding declarations of

intent, there is no certainty that established structures concern themselves with those areas of activity which are conventionally ascribed to labour unions in democratic industrialized societies. Again, it may be highly inadvisable to rely on this practice as a rationale for the adoption or rejection of military unions in other countries.

3.   Notwithstanding these reservations about the general applicability of the European analogue, it can nevertheless be hypothesized that selected aspects of the European experience of military unions will be relevant to any study of the potential development elsewhere. Accordingly, a further analysis of this experience may facilitate the identification of those relevant features of the European model which could be used in comparative analysis.

The Research Study

The primary objective of this study, therefore, is the further examination of the European experience of military unionism. The study begins with a brief analysis of the organizational setting to consider not only the theoretical background to the demand within armed forces for the establishment of some form of group representation, but also the response in European armed forces to such a demand. From this, the study moves to the analysis of a theoretical typology of group representation systems in armed forces. There is a variety of possible structures ranging from forms of 'unions' through 'professional associations' to informal soldiers' committees. The constructed typology is then related to contemporary European practice to test the hypothesis which has been noted previously, namely that :

No country in Western European industrialized society has established for its armed forces a military union the structure, practice and objectives of which are commensurate with those of labour unions in economic organizations.

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In testing this hypothesis, a further section of this study is devoted to the more detailed analysis of practice in those systems of group representation which have been established. An important feature of this analysis is the comparison between this practice and those activities within the AVF which are similarly concerned with issues of personnel management such as pay, conditions of service, grievance procedures and the resolution of 'industrial' conflict. In other words, we are concerned with those areas of activity which in economic organisations are often subsumed under the heading of 'industrial relations'.

From such comparative analysis we turn to the complex issue of the mood, motive and disposition of European military personnel in the context of demands for the creation of systems of group representation. This is an area of concern which in the AVF invites emotive reactions. One kind of reaction in the United States, for example, is summarized in the comments of General Robert A. Dixon :[11]

> The Air Force is a union - an inside union. It can
> create a false impression of lack of support from the
> top, among our members, because our leadership cannot
> behave as outside union chiefs do in expressing our needs,
> wants and views.

This and comparable statements made in the United Kingdom and United States by senior military leaders can, nevertheless, be contrasted with that expression of opinion which continues to stress the potential advantages of military unionization. Here, European experience has a particular relevance. The fundamental question in effect is <u>why</u> attitudes, motives and dispositions in the AVF are presumed to differ so radically from those to be found in continental European armed forces. In part, we are concerned here with dimensions of the equality thesis. Is, for example the, satisfaction of the principle of 'social justice' of more concern to governments in continental Eutope than in the United States or the United Kingdom ? At a second level, questions about cultural organizational and strategic variables merit much further analysis, since these are repeatedly proferred as explanations for presumed differences in attitudes, motives and dispositions among military personnel within the AVF.

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Yet another aspect of this area of interest is clearly summarized by Taylor and Arango. They comment that the 'burden of proof' to justify a fundamental change of the status quo within armed forces demands demonstration of the following arguments :[12]

1) The present system is so bad that a change is really necessary.

2) The problems of the present system can be resolved only be the institution of military unions.

3) Military unions would solve the problems of the present system without creating other problems worse than those in existence; and

4) Not only would military unions solve the problems of the present system, but would lead to additional advantages in the public interest which the present system does not yield.

This suggests that notwithstanding any evidence of a mood to seek unionization among the military personnel of the AVF, the critical issue is that of proving the advantages to be gained from such unionization. Such an approach reflects the expression of a concern with question of effectiveness, that is with the impact of unionization upon military organization. This is the basis of the next final section of this study. Given that this question invites value-judgements, it is nevertheless necessary to review European experience in the light of the conclusions which have been reached about the classification and definition of European systems of group-representation. From such comparative analysis it is possible to consider such aspects of effectiveness as institutional alternatives to military unionization, thereby linking this final section with the earlier areas of research interest.

The main objective of this study, therefore, is the further examination of European experience with systems of group representation in the military. Such an analysis will exemplify the themes of equality , effectiveness and political control as they relate to armed forces in modern industrialized societies. It will facilitate an understanding of the mood and motives of European military personnel. It will draw attention to established structures and practices. Most importantly, it

will seek to relate this experience to the wider issue of the relationship between armed forces and society in a situation of organizational and sociopolitical change by supplying documentation and analysis to sharpen the focus of debate.

Notes and References

1. Among the many publications which are available, the following
    concern themselves particularly with the analysis and
    evaluation of these effects : William J. Taylor Jnr.,
    Roger J. Arango and Robert S. Lockwood (eds.):
    Military Unions : U.S. Trends and Issues. (Beverly Hills,
    Cal., Sage Publications, 1977) and Alan Ned Sabrosky,
    Blue-Collar Soldiers : Unionization and the U.S. Military
    (Beverly Hills, Cal., Sage Publications, 1978).

2. The unionization of the armed forces in Western European nation-
    states is well covered in an issue of Armed Forces and Society
    2 (Summer 1976) in a series of articles on military unions in
    Belgium, West Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and France.
    Raymond E. Bell Jnr, also considers the historical example of
    a unionized all-volunteer force, that of Austria from 1920-1934,
    in 'Military Unions and Military Effectiveness : Austria as a
    Case Study, 1920-1934,in Taylor et al, op cit, pp 74 - 91.

3. David Cortright, 'Unions and Democracy' in Taylor et al, op cit
    pp 217-232 at p. 217.

4. Robert F. Cocklin, 'Military Unionism - A Hoax and Deception',
    in Taylor et al, op cit, pp 265-71 at p 266.

5. Ralph A. Hallanback, 'Civil Supremacy and the Military Union:
    The Systemic Implications', in Taylor et al, op cit, pp 233-44
    at p 239.

6. Statement by Master Sergeant Heinrich Luden, military co-
    ordinator for the Federation of Government, Service, Transport
    and Communications Workers (OTV) of the FDR. Quoted by
    Cortright, op cit, p 227.

7. Congressional Record (March 4, 1976) s 2807.

8. See, for example, David Cortright, Report to the AFGE: Military
    Unions of Europe. (Washington D.C., American Federation
    of Government Employees, August, 1976.)

9. The Danish model is explained in Steen Borup-Nielsen, "The
    Right to Trade Union Membership within the Danish Armed Forces"
    (Copenhagen, n.p. 1977). A revised version of the original
    paper is given at Appendix A to this Report.

10. William J. Taylor Jnr., 'Military Unions : The Irrelevance of
    the European Experience'. Naval War College Review (1977)
    pp 79-88.

11. The Inspector General (Brief 8, 1977), pp 1-2.

12. William J. Taylor Jnr. and Roger J. Arango, 'MilitaryEffectiveness
    The Basic Issues of Military Unionization', in Taylor et al, op cit,
    pp 245-264 at p 262.

Chapter I
The Organizational Setting

In his classic study, The Professional Soldier Morris Janowitz advances the hypothesis that the organizational revolution which pervades contemporary society and which implies management by means, explanation and expertise, is also to be found in the military.[1] Subsequent studies have made considerable use of this basic hypothesis in further critical analysis of the organizational changes taking place within armed forces, and the pattern and direction of this research can be noted in the considerable body of literature which has evolved. Initially, many theorists suggested that military organization was becoming increasingly similar to civilian industrial organization.[2] Subsequently, however, as Segal points out, scholars were beginning to postulate limits to the degree to which structural convergence could occur.[3] One conclusion which was reached from the ensuing convergence/divergence debate was that while combat formations diverged structurally from civilian institutions, non-combat agencies converged. Irrespective, however, of the validity of any reached conclusion to this debate about the theoretical dimensions of the civilian-military organizational differential, many practical questions remain unsolved. One important issue which thus merits further attention is the issue of the extent to which strategies adopted from civilian industry can in fact yield positive incremental change within the military organization. A corollary of this is the question of the extent to which the military can structurally resemble other organizations in modern society, particularly economic organizations, and still fulfill its combat function.

The significance of these two issues is epitomized in the current debate about the implications for the military organization of a growing demand within armed forces for some form of group representation of a type comparable to that which exists in economic organizations. Hitherto, despite the large volume of literature which has analysed the civilian-military organizational differential, this · particular aspect of individual and organizational needs has largely been ignored. Although a persistent feature of civilian institutions has been

the routinization of the adverse relationship between labour and management through unionization and collective bargaining, the debate about the convergence or divergence of civilian and military organizations has rarely considered this part of the work situation. With the exception of a relatively small number of studies, the very existence of a demand for group representation within armed forces, let alone the effect of establishing a system of representation upon organizational change and task fulfillment in the military, has been overlooked.

This failure in the past to examine more critically both the demand for, and the spread of, systems of group representation within the armed forces of Western industrialized societies is, to say the least, surpr ising. A persistent reluctance to analyse the impact of these systems upon existing organizational structures or a belief that prohibitory legislation per se is capable of checking the growth of such a demand, ignores the considerable evidence within these societies of changing attitudes amongst servicemen towards the setting up of systems of group representation. Manley et al, for example, conclude from a survey of a representative sample of United States Air Force personnel that the latter believed they could tangibly benefit from military union representation :[5]

> Over half of all respondents expressed beliefs
> that a military union could prevent further
> erosion of fringe benefits; secure higher pay
> rises; effectively represent the interests of
> military personnel by lobbying with the Congress;
> help the individual to resolve disputes through
> direct negotiation with the air force; and help
> solve problems w h i c h the individual would
> be unable to resolve on his own.

Segal and Kramer similarly note that although the potential impact of unionization on the internal operation of the Army is viewed unfavourably by their sample of Army officers and enlisted men, the possible benefits of unionization are well recognized.[6] Even in the United Kingdom where the military has traditionally been identified with a conservative and

normative-based ethos, an ethos which by and large implies the existence of an organizational climate that does not stimulate a demand for unionization, there is evidence of changing attitudes amongst servicemen. Thus the Report of the Army Welfare Inquiry Committee in commenting upon attitudes towards military pay and allowances, notes : [7]

> We heard from a number of officers and men
>
> who expressed concern that because, the
>
> Army lacked the services of a trade union,
>
> they had to accept whatever was offered to them.

These changing attitudes among servicemen, moreover, imply the creation of an organizational climate in which the disposition to assess critically the potential benefits of unionization is indicative of a delicate balance between opposing sets of forces. This state can be readily upset by changes in either the forces which restrain or encourage such a disposition. Thus a feeling that the rate of reward is less than that to be obtained in civilian employment or that the privileges of the military have been eroded, can readily encourage a demand for enhanced group representation.[8] Even in a 'steady state', Manley et al suggest from their sample of air force personnel that 37% of the enlisted respondents and 16% of the officers were prepared to join a military union.[9] This implies that any evaluation of the dimensions of the demand amongst servicemen for military group representation, has to take into account not only the expressed preference of these officers and enlisted men but also these underlying changes in mood and attitude.

What all of this suggests is that increasingly in western industrialized society we are witnessing radical changes to conventional patterns of military organization. It may be that the traditional perception of armed forces as a fusion of profession and organization in which such key concepts as 'honour', 'duty' 'patriotism' characterized group attitudes can no longer be accepted without question. Seemingly, we have entered a new phase of an organizational revolution, a revolution which has witnessed over time the transition from the feudal military to the traditional military but which is now encouraging the evolution of a post-industrial form of military organization. This

changed format generates its own defining characteristics: the narrowing of the skill differential between civilian and military organizations; the growth of instrumental attitudes among group members; the re-definition of military professionalism and the search for conditions of employment comparable with those enjoyed in the wider society. As Segal and Kramer conclude :[10]

> Where the military once was a unique social
> institution, and military service had many of the
> attributes of a calling, competition with industry
> and commerce for quality personnel has increasingly
> brought the military institution to resemble civilian
> work places, and military service to be regarded
> more an occupation than a calling.

An important feature of this changed organization is thus the demand for the creation within armed forces of some form of group representation. Indeed, it may be possible to agree with Moskos that the potential for unionization is great, 'precisely because military social organization has moved in the direction of the occupational model'.[11] But irrespective of the validity or otherwise of Moskos's conclusion, what is certain is that within the armed forces of contemporary western industrialized society, there is increasing evidence of a demand for the promotion and furtherance of military unionization.

The Response to Change

Anglo-American commentators on this demand for unionization, irrespective of whether they come from the military or academia, have tended to assume that the concept of military unionism is a novel feature in the organization of armed forces. A preference for the maintenance of the status quo and the social supports of the older institutional format has, in the past, led many commentators to overlook continental European experience. There is, however, considerable evidence in western industrialized society of the specific establishment of trade unions, professional associations and soldiers' committees within military organizations. It is thus estimated for example that some sixty representative bodies have been set up in Western Europe with Denmark alone supporting twenty-five separate organizations.[12] This total,

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moreover, does not take account the very large number of unofficial soldiers' committees which have sprung up in France.

It has to be noted, however, that the demand for the establishment of systems of group representation has not been universally welcomed by national governments. The dichotomy of official response is very clear :

1. Countries where Military Group Representation
is Legal :
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Austria, Belgium,
West Germany and the Netherlands.

2. Countries where Military Group Representation
is not Legal :
France, Turkey, Canada, Spain, Italy, United
States and the United Kingdom.

Where forms of military group representation are seen to be illegal, the legal prohibition is usually clearly expressed. In France, for example, Army Regulation 30 of April 1st, 1933 precludes the formation of professional military groups and prevents military personnel on active service from belonging to civilian trade unions. Article 10 of the new military disciplinary regulations states that :

> The soldier on active service should not
> affiliate himself to groups or associations
> of a syndicalist nature - - - the soldier
> completing his national service, who was a
> member of these types of groups before his
> incorporation into service, should
> abstain from syndicalist activity while
> serving his time in the army.

There are, however, a number of qualifications which modify this simple categorization. Thus Italy has had under study a representative system for servicemen which would give military representatives a limited authority and opportunity to negotiate in the fields of judicial status, wages and welfare. It is stressed, however, that the system under study envisages the creation of a representative

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body and not some form of Trade Union.[13]   The United Kingdom
prohibition which is laid down in Queens' Regulations seems at first to
be absolute :

> All combinations of officers and men formed
> for the purpose of bringing about alterations
> in the existing regulations or customs of the
> Service, whether affecting their interests
> individually or collectively are prohibited - - -

This is nevertheless qualified in that there is no regulation to prevent an
individual joining the civilian union or professional association which is
appropriate to his military trade or specialization.   Indeed, individuals
may be actively encouraged to apply for membership prior to their
leaving the armed forces and seeking employment in civilian industry.
What is illegal, is the 'combination' to exert pressure on the military
and political leadership.   This is reminiscent of the English 'Combination
Acts' of the nineteenth century which were similarly designed to prevent
the emergence of a trade union movement by creating the crime of
'combination'.

In Turkey, where the ban on servicemen forming unions or
associations to protect their economic, social or cultural interests is
also absolute, servicemen, however, can join those professional
associations established by special law and 'acceptable' to the Ministry
of Defence.   Additionally, all servicemen are members of OYAK
(Organization for the Mutual Aid of the Members of the Armed Forces),
a body which has been set up in accordance with the provisions of Act
No. 205.   Elsewhere in Europe, where systems of group representation
within the military are prima facie legal, specific and special
restrictions may apply to conscripts.   Thus both Norway and Denmark
differentiate between regular servicemen and conscripts with regard to
the type of representative body which has been established.

A further qualification is reflected in debates about the
constitutionality of a legal ban on military unions.   Thus a 1977 study of
the Congressional Research Service in the United States of America,[14]
concludes that :

In the light of cases reviewed in this report
the type of legislation most likely to raise
serious constitutional problems would include
prohibitions against 1) membership,
2) solicitation of membership, 3) distribution
of literature (unless there is a threat to
loyalty, discipline or moral), and 4) the
assertion of the right to strike, in the
absence of overt conduct to incite a strike.

This, together with the expressed opinion that there is clear constitutional authority for prohibitatory measures in certain areas, such as collective bargaining and participation or assistance in strikes, and the evidence of specific legislative proposals in the 94th and 95th Congress to ban military unions, [15] suggests again that the simple classification of countries into those where military unions are legal and those where they are not, ignores the qualifying factors which exist in practice.

Nevertheless, there is despite these qualifications a fundamental distinction between those countries in which group representation is legal and the remainder, a distinction which is most marked. In the former, complex systems of association within the armed forces have been set up, their establishment reflecting an important aspect of what is seen to be an accepted work relationship in civilian organizations. In the latter, on the other hand, the significance of such a relationship is either ignored or rejected. There may be evidence of a demand for the creation of some form of group representation within armed forces. Pressure groups both inside and outside the military organization may seek to establish unions, associations or committees, but their demands are often rejected or dismissed out of hand.

Yet the importance both of these demands and of the potential effect of systems of group representation upon established forms of military organization are so pronounced that such demands cannot be readily discccunted.

What is clear, however, from much of the discussion which has taken, and is taking place, is that individual response to demands for what

are often claimed to be the basic human rights of freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of assembly, is frequently linked with emotive evaluation. This is particularly noticeable where these demands are identified with the subsequent establishment of a trade union with a concomitant expansion of industrial conflict and the organized withdrawal of labour. What such an evaluation ignores, however, is the alternative forms of group representation which can be set up. Yet such a reaction is understandable, for the spread of group representation in general and military unionism in particular is seen by many critics to pose a major threat to the perpetuation of traditional forms of military organization.

Equally, many arguments about the establishment of soldiers' unions within an armed force are ultimately emotional discussions about their effect upon potential military effectiveness. In this context, two contrasting basic premises inhibit rational discussion. On the one hand, opposition to the creation of group representation is founded on the belief that such systems must axiomatically weaken military effectiveness. On the other, proponents of these systems base their arguments on the assumptions that the advantages of giving servicemen a say in the things that affect their everyday lives necessarily outweigh any possible decrease in military capability. Again the emphasis placed on these polarized premises tends to promote a discussion which ignores the whole range of alternative strategies and the relative costs of adopting one solution in preference to another.

The Representation of Servicemen

An appropriate starting point for the further study of these issues is the analysis of the manner in which the interests of servicemen can be represented by systems of group representation within armed forces. From this, the questions posed previously can be considered in greater depth before attention is paid to contemporary national practice. Only after such an enquiry has been undertaken, can any tentative conclusions be drawn.

In this context, 'group representation' can be defined in the following terms :

The existence and activity of any organized group
of servicemen in protecting and furthering the
interests of group members as employees of the
state.

It is not claimed that this definition is exclusive, for a number of
alternative formulations can be constructed. These reflect the varied
weighting given either to a selected goal or to the multiple objectives
acceptable to a specific group representational system. The working
definition which is given here, however, is designed to highlight the
following essential characteristics of any system of group representation;

1. Group representation is based on an organized
collectivity, that is, to say it can be distinguished
from any informal interaction of individuals acting
in their own interest.

2. The primary objective of group representation
is the protection and advancement of the interests of
group members. Such an objective can therefore
be differentiated from the goals of those associational
or institutional interest groups which seek to influence
the more general exercise of public power in the field
of defence policy.

3. Group representation is essentially concerned
with the status of servicemen as employees of the
state. This concern rejects the view that the
military and the state form a unitary system having
one source of authority and one focus of loyalty, for
it recognizes that the interests of servicemen as
employees are not necessarily coincidental with the
interests of the government as employers.

This system of group representation is implemented in practice
through organizations composed in total or in part of members of the
armed forces. The structure and form of these organizations, in common
with their manifest and latent objectives, differ very considerably. All
the created organizations, however, despite their diversity, embody the
characteristics which have been specified.

The adopted working definition is deliberately expressed in general terms to meet the major problem that the variation in the organizational forms and functions of what are popularly termed military unions, is such that comparative analysis cannot begin from the premise that a single European model exists. The generalized defintion of 'group representation' thus recognizes a situation in which there is, at best, a multiplicity of organizational models.

The definition also acknowledges that within armed forces there may exist a demand for the introduction of some change to existing personnel policies which falls short of a demand for military unionization per se. The existence of such a demand was recognized by U S Secretary of Labour, F. Ray Marshall at his confirmation hearing on 13th January, 1977 :

> I think there is probably some merit
> to mechanisms to permit military personnel
> to participate in the formulation of
> some rules governing their living conditions

The notion of group representation thus accommodates the argument that military personnel lack adequate participation in those national policy planning procedures which affect them individually and as a group.

A Typology of Representation

An analysis of European practice suggests that three major forms of group representation can be established within military organizations :

1. Professional Associations
2. Trade Unions
3. Representative Committees

Each of these categories can, however, be further divided and it is the presence of multi-various types of group representation which characterizes contemporary European practi ce.

Professional Associations

It has been consistently argued that the hallmark of
professionalism is the establishment by an occupational group of a
professional association.[16]   For many occupations, these associations
through their attempts to ensure the exclusiveness of group activity,
have become the locus of a sanctions mechanism and the centre of an
authority.   Indeed, some associations have been able to gain control
over specific aspects of non-occupational behaviour.   The extent,
however, to which these aims will be actualized varies in relation to the
objects and form of the established association and a basic typology
suggests that there are seven such bodies whose activities are relevant
in the general analysis of occupational groups.   The eighth, which can
be termed the Prestige Association, is of limited direct value for
membership of such a body primarily confers a particular honour on the
individual who is invited to join the association.[17]

The remaining seven types of association differ considerably in
their objectives.   In the context of this study, however, two of these are
of particular significance :

1.   The Protective Association
2.   The Prerogative Association

In the first of these, the association exists to provide an organized means
of exerting pressure on outsiders to protect the working conditions and
remuneration of individual group members.   Some of the objectives of
this type of association are thus comparable with those of a trade union,
for in their negotiations over salary and working conditions, the
association may adopt industrial bargaining techniques.   In the United
Kingdom, this has been particularly noticeable in the activities of the
British Medical Association (BMA) and the British Airline Pilots
Association (BALPA).   In the former case, for example, a ministerial
decision which reduced the pay lead that military doctors had enjoyed
after 1962 over their colleagues in the National Health Service, led the
BMA to withdraw their co-operation from the Ministry of Defence's
recruiting programme.   From 1966, therefore, until 1969 there were
almost no new entries of medical cadets other than those who were in

training and committed to enter the military before the BMA 'blacklisted' the Service career.[18] In this respect, therefore, the positive authority which the association has attained over medical affairs, enables it to offer direct economic benefits to its members comparable with those offered by a trade union.

At the same time, however, we must note that other no less important objectives of a protective association are clearly distinguishable from the aims of a trade union, for these are the services which the former renders to society as a whole by protecting individual clients and the public at large from injury or exploitation.[19] Nevertheless, a noticeable development in the history of this type of association, is that some bodies, notwithstanding their claim to professional status, have applied for and have been granted affiliation with national trade union movements.

In establishing a protective association or associations within military organizations, the organizational setting nevertheless is such as to create a number of specific problem areas. The initial difficulty is that whereas for most occupational groups the creation of a professional association is the starting point in a regular sequence of professionalization, such an association within armed forces is an ex post not a priori condition. The concept of the military as a profession antedates those processes of professionalization which are essentially concomitants of industrialization. Consequently, a protective association which is established at this time within the military has to accommodate existing norms, values and attitudes, many of which are derived from established formal and informal traditions. Moreover, many of these internalized attitudes are incompatible with the aims of the protective association.

A second problem is associated with the very definition of the military profession. Conventionally, professionalism has been associated with the mores of officership, that is, the identifying characteristics of the military profession are derived from the career and skills of the officer. Enlisted men and women, on the other hand, have been seen as 'craftsmen' or skilled workers rather than 'professionals'. One critical question, therefore, is whether a military professional

association can include within its membership personnel other than officers, or whether such an association must by definition be 'elitist' in composition.

A third problem follows on from this. The term 'military professional' does not in itself recognize the heterogeneity of the occupational group. Armed forces, in common with other areas of the public service, employ a large number of individuals who have qualified in a wide variety of 'professional' occupations. The military organization thus includes among its members doctors, dentists, clergymen, engineers, nurses, accountants and so on. Can a single protective association meet the needs of these diverse occupational specialists ? Will such specialists look to the military association or will they relate to those external associations of which they are members by virtue of their training and qualification outside the military organization ? When to this diversity of interests is added the differences among the separate services which are encapsulated in the term, 'the military', then the question which has to be asked is whether a single protective association is a feasibility.

This draws attention to the fourth problem. Here the central issue can be summarized in the question 'Protection against whom' ? Members of the armed forces are essentially bureaucratic professionals, for the primary skill of the occupational group can only be exercised by professionals as state employees within a highly structured organizational setting. Those aspects of the protective association which are concerned with the status and power of the ideal-type independent free practitioner therefore have little of any relevance to the condition of military professionals. The latter are specialists whose task commitment is performed in a monopolistic organization which determines their status, evaluates their ability according to operational requirements, and delineates, through a process of selection and designation, the precise area within which activities will be performed. What this means in practice is that any established association is primarily oriented in terms of its objectives towards those aspects of the work role which are derived from the 'vertical' structure of the bureaucratic organization rather than the 'horizontal' structure of the independent profession. In other words,

the protective association in the bureaucracy tends to become ⊥most exclusively involved in issues appertaining to superior-subordinate relationships within the organization.

In general terms, such involvement occurs at one of two levels. Either the 'superior' is identified as the employer - that is, the Government, the political head of the military or the State - or the 'superior' is seen as an individual within the established chain of command. In the first case, the creation of a protective association within armed forces can be considered to pose a threat to the principle of civil control of the armed forces. In the second, the association can be evaluated as a major challenge to those principles of rational-legal authority within a hierarchical structure which are a defining characteristic of the modern bureaucracy. In short, the creation of a protective association has major dysfunctional consaquences for the effective exercise of expertise within the organization. Indeed, a recognition of the existence of these consequences tends to encourage the transformation of the protective association into a trade union, since the latter is believed to respond more effectively to the needs of organizational members.

The Prerogative Association

An alternative form of association which has considerable relevance to the military situation is the prerogative association. This type of association evolved at a time when professionalization within armed forces antedated the search of most occupational groups for professional status. Its fundamental characteristics have always been and continue to be : a) a high level of skills; b) an important degree of self-regulation; and c) a strong element of corporate cohesion.[20] Over time such an association has been subjected to considerable change. Originally these associations constituted the military. Individuals, for example, were encouraged by the central government to recruit fellow officers and enlisted men who, in effect, joined the sub-group rather than the overall organization. In some countries - England and France for example - offices within the association could be purchased. In other instances, as in the embryonic United States, the

the association elected its own officers whose appointments were simply confirmed by the central authority. As armed forces, however, became more complex institutions, the bureaucratic form of organization was adopted and developed by the military.[21] But the basic elements of the prerogative association still persist within the military organization. In some instances, informal mechanisms, implanted as part of a complex socialization process, continue to influence the manner in which tasks are carried out. In others, more formal means of perpetuating the basic features of this type of association are adopted . On the one hand, for instance, legal rules have replaced custom and convention. Thus although it could be argued at one time :[22]

> 'that no gentleman needed a code of ethics and
> that no code of ethics would make a gentleman
> out of a crook',

legal sanctions now provide for the rigid control of occupational and non-occupational behaviour.[23] On the other hand, the adopted organizational format institutionalizes the _mores_ and conventions of the association. Here, the classic example is the emphasis placed in the British Army upon the regimental system.

The prerogative association thus continues to play an important part in maintaining the cohesion and professional identity of military personnel. It can be noted that such an association may be both formally and informally instituted, but in either case pressure is exerted upon external groups to protect the interests of association members. It is only rarely in contemporary armed forces that the formally constituted prerogative association can be identified in its pure and traditional form although "Palace Guards", may be a continuing example of such continuity. In most armed forces, however, it is the informal aspects of the association which are of greater significance.

Nevertheless, it would be injudicious in either instance to conclude that the continuing importan ce of this type of professional association has no dysfunctional consequences. One problem arises when organizational changes which are seen to be desirable, if not essential, are delayed or blocked by the prerogative association. In this

situation, the question is whether the interests of the group reprsented by the association take precedence over the interests of the wider society or the state. The problem, moreover, is accentuated when the prerogative association primarily represents the interests of a sub-group such as the regiment, academy graduates or a small cadre of regular officers within the collectivity as a whole. This creates a form of internal conflict within the organization which may directly affect operational effectiveness. Thus Correlli Barnett, in discussing the post-war British Army emphasizes the continued power of regimental loyalties. He suggests that to meet the operational needs of this army, 'the practical needs of modern war pointed at only one answer : a Corps of Infantry'. He continues : [24]

> Nevertheless after the Second World War
> passionate sentimental loyalties prevented
> a Corps of Infantry being formed. Instead
> all kinds of uneasy expedients were employed
> in order to try to reconcile flexibility of
> posting and reinforcement with the independence
> of the ancient regiments.

A second problem may occur in a situation in which the prerogative association is not necessarily acting in direct defence of its members' interests. This is where the association believes that its professional expertise justifies its acting 'for the public good'. This is the motive of the 'national interest'. The prerogative association may believe that it has a duty to act when the permanent interests of the nationa are seen to be under threat. In extreme instances the conception of custodianship which is implicit in this perception of 'duty' is actualized in 'the overt rulership of the nation and the establishment of a more or less complete political programme under their authority'. [25] In other instances, to follow Finer, the military sees it as a duty to arbitrate or veto. In both instances, however, the degree of professionalism which is the basis of the continuance of the prerogative association, can motivate it towards intervention in the domain of the civil power.

In extreme cases, the prerogative association may refrain from

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In extreme cases, the prerogative association may refrain from

which has evolved.   Professional associations within the armed forces by stressing the professional interests of their members may thus increase a sense of strain within the organization, a strain, moreover, which may have a number of dysfunctional consequences for armed forces as a whole.

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15.   On 4th January, 1977, the 95th Congress received the first
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       session of the 94th Congress.   On 18th March, 1977, the
       Senate Armed Services Committee held a one day hearing on
       S. 997, the bill by Senator Thurmond to amend United States Code,
       Chapter 49, Title 10 and thereby prohibit union organization and
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       The constitutional implications of these and similar proposals
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       For a further discussion of these associations, see
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21.   For a further elaboration of this point, see G. Harries-Jenkins
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22.   Cited by F. H. Newell, 'Ethics of the Engineering Profession'
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23.   In the United Kingdom, for example, 5.64 of the Air Force Act
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                'Every officer ... who behaves in a scandalous manner
        unbecoming the character of an officer and a gentleman, shall,
        on conviction by court-martial, be cashiered'.
                                                ' The scandalous
        behaviour may be either of a service or a social character.
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25.   S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback (London, Pall Mall Press,
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Chapter II

Trade Unions in Armed Forces

In identifying the defining characteristics of trade unions within armed forces, a major conceptual problem is that national perceptions of this type of group representation differ widely. Bais cultural and historical differences within Western European industrialized societies are such that it is impossible to define a single universal model of a trade union in either the general area of economic activity or the specific example of the armed forces.

A linked problem is that the distinction between professional associations and trade unions is neither clear nor certain. On the grounds that the functions of the former are varied, whereas trade unions are primarily concerned with bargaining with employees on behalf of their members, it has been said that the functions of professional associations and trade unions can be sharply distinguished with neither showing signs of encroaching or the other.[1] This is true to the extent that many functions of professional associations are not shared by trade unions, but a tendency towards convergence can also be seen.[2] Not only are trade unions and professional associations both interest groups which are a special kind of secondary group in work organizations with authority structures but their primary functions can also be seen to coincide.

Thus the British Ministry of Labour in the 1950s accepted that trade unions were 'all organizations of employees - including those of salaried and professional workers, as well as those of manual wage-earners - which are known to include among their functions that of negotiating with employers with the object of regulating conditions of employment'.[3] The important point which follows from this is that since bureaucratic professionals such as members of the armed forces are wage earners, then the Ministry of Labour definition implies that any form of group representation in the military should perforce be seen as a trade union. This, however, begs the question of whether professional associations in bureaucratic organizations fully fit the Webb's classic definition of a trade union as 'a continuous association of wage earners for the purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their working-lives'.[4]

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In the absence of a single trade union model, and in the light of the uncertainty which is apparent in the union/association debate, it may be that we can only follow Gross, in that, rather than seeking to differentiate between a professional association and a trade union it is better to posit a continuum along which collectivities may be located according to the degree to which they exhibit various attributes.[5] This would then suggest that three sets of attributes are of particular relevance in considering further the possible role and function of military trade unions as part of a system of group representation :

1.   Trade Union Structure
2.   Relations between the Union and the Employer
3.   Political Activities of the Union

Although these attributes can be grouped separately to facilitate analysis, they are initially interdependent, and any evaluation of the extent to which a system of group representation within armed forces does or does not take the form of a trade union has to take into account the effects of such interdependence.

1.   Trade Union Structure

The structural pattern of trade unions in the field of economic activity has traditionally been described in terms of the type of skill and basis of organization.   The classification is thus based on the identification of three groups: craft, industrial and general unions.   Craft unions which are the oldest type with a history that may be traced back to the mediaeval guild, have in their pure form much in common with the professional association.   In both instances, membership is theoretically limited to those who are qualified to carry out specific tasks by virtue of an acquired skill.   Within craft unions therefore, it is possible to denote a high level of specialization.   We have to emphasize, however, the caveat of 'theoretically', for it is evident that some craft unions have found the criterion of apprenticeship as the basis of membership unduly limiting.   Consequently, it has been argued that the narrow definition of craft union is better replaced by use of the classification of skilled unions and ex-craft unions.   The latter term then denotes those craft unions which have changed the basis of their membership to include

semi-skilled and unskilled workers.   Industrial unions, however, cater for all skilled and unskilled workers within an industry whereas general unions cater for workers in many industries.

This traditional classification, however, does not take into account the unprecedented growth in recent years of unions of non-manual workers.   These white-collar unions which cater for administrative, clerical, supervisory and technical workers constituted, even in 1961, more than 20% of all unionists in the United Kingdom.[7] Since then their membership has increased further, particularly amongst senior administrative and supervisory staff.   They should, however, be distinguished from staff associations.   The notion of a union depends upon a purposive -ideology in which a set of doctrines can be used if necessary to legitimize opposition to managerial rule, assert the desirability of independence, and create a group feeling which can provide the basis for collective action should it be required.[8]   In staff association, on the other hand, the role of such doctrines is minimal.   The collectivity is seen by its leaders and members to depend heavily for its existence upon the grace and favour of the employer.   Alternatively, they see their best interests in cooperating with the employer, replacing ideologies of opposition, challenge and hositility in favour of doctrines which promote the validity and desirability of collaboration.   Thus while ideologies of opposition are to the fore in unions with their emphasis on separateness, loyalty to the norms and values of the group and on the absolute value of workers' solidarity, staff associations, in contrast, emphasize the value of consensus, loyalty to the organization and the merit of team spirit and esprit de corps.

In the context of systems of group representation within armed forces, the distinctions which are implicit in these classifications are of critical importance.   The majority of criticisms of 'military unions' begin from the assumption that such unions have to be identified with industrial or general unions or at least with craft unions.   From this, it is accepted in the words of Dahrendorf that :[9]

> Since the industrial enterprise has an authority structure
> and is therefore an imperatively coordinated association,
> we are entitled to assume that the incumbents of positions

of domination and subjection within it are united in two
conflicting quasi-groups with certain latent interests.

In other words, it is logical to assume that the creation of military trade
unions acknowledges the existence of a conflict of latent interests in the
armed forces, a conflict which arises from the differential distribution
of authority.

Two important issues, however, merit further analysis. Firstly
we have to question the validity of the analogue with the industrial
enterprise.   Notwithstanding the possible convergence between features
of the armed forces and industrial organizations, it is still possible to
argue that in terms of the thesis of 'conflicting quasi-groups', a major
distinction can be drawn between the military and the industrial enterprise.
The theoretical basis of this distinction is clearly brought out by
Dahrendorf in an analysis of bureaucratic role and political authority. He
writes : [10]

> Bureaucratic organizations differ from industrial
> organizations in one important point.   Whereas the
> authority structure of industrial organizations
> ipsofacto defines the borderline that divides the two
> aggregates of those in positions of dominance and
> those in positions of subjection, and whereas industrial
> organizations are in this sense dichotomous,
> bureaucratic organizations typically display continuous
> gradations of competence and authority and are
> hierarchical.   Within dichotomous organizations class
> conflict is possible; within hierarchical organizations
> it is not.

What this implies is that in bureaucratic organizations - among
which we can include the military - industrial disputes cannot be
associated with that sense of class conflict which is endemic within the
economic enterprise.   In the latter, the authority structure generates
the two quasi-groups of management and labor, along with their latent
interests.   From these are developed the interest groups of employers'
associations and trade unions, with their specific manifest interests.

In the bureaucratic organization, in contrast, the hierarchical structure of authority cannot create the them / us dichotomy with its associated characteristics of class conflict such as the existence of the traditional type of trade union. This is not to suggest that conflict is totally absent within bureaucratic organizations. What it does mean is that here a dichotomous image of society is replaced by a definition of bureaucratic roles in which in the absence of a class based conflict of interests, conflict and tension arise characteristically from the frustrations of individual or group expectations.

If this thesis be accepted as valid, then it can be hypothesized that because of the absence of class conflict, trade unions in armed forces will be sharply differentiated from craft, industrial or general unions. The military is the archetype bureaucracy. A hierarchical authority structure embraces a rational ordering of authority linked to the exercise of technical competence. Notwithstanding the dysfunctional consequences of such a structure, the pattern of organization equates closely with that of the bureaucratic model proposed by Dahrendorf. If his thesis is valid then, to re-iterate the point, the absence of class conflict inhibits the creation or emergence of those types of trade unions which have traditionally been found in economic organizations. What is more likely to arise is some form of collectivity which represents the interests of servicemen vis-a-vis the state as employer. This could be some form of protective professional association. Alternatively, it could be a prerogative association in which the existing military leadership acts to protect and further group interests. What the collectivity cannot be, according to this thesis, is a traditional type of union, the rationale for which is the existence of class conflict within the organization, a conflict which is epitomized in the existence of two competing and conflicting quasi-groups.

Moskos, however, draws attention to an important dimension of superordination and subordination within the armed forces which questions the basis of the Dahrendorf hypothesis. [11]

> In few contemporary institutions are the lines
> between superiors and subordinates so sharply
> and consistently drawn as they are in the military

establishment.   In contrast with civilian life, the
military organization is unique in that glaring
inequalities between the ranks coexist with
relative monetary parity.   Simply put, the
internal stratification of the military is founded
almost entirely on status rather than income
distinctions.

This suggests that there is a conflict of interests within the armed   forces
and that the basis of potential stress is the significant status differences
between officers and enlisted men.   From this, it can be further
hypothesized that established military trade unions will, in common with
unions in the economic sector be concerned with the protection of the
interests of one or other of the conflicting status groups.

We are thus presented with two contrasting interpretations of
the relationships between the authority structure in bureaucratic
organizations and the emergence of a conflict of latent interests which
become manifest within trade unio ns.   The validity of both interpretations
can be rationalized.   Dahrendorf, is concerned with class conflict ;
Moskos with status conflict.   The distinction between these two forms of
conflict can be related to a substantial body of theory and to a rich variety
of empirical evidence.   In practical terms, however, the issue which
still remains unresolved is whether the analogue between the industrial
enterprise and the bureaucratic military organization is valid.   From this,
the question is whether collectives in armed forces can be identified as
corresponding to craft, single-industry or general unions, whether they
are examples of a different type of trade-union, or whether they can only
be professional associations. The question is then the extent to which it
is feasible to identify examples of group representation in the armed
forces as white-collar unions or staff associations which can be
differentiated from craft, industrial or general unions.   White-collar
unions are a notable feature of other bureaucratic organizations.   Indeed
it is significant that much of the external pressure to promote unions
within the armed forces has come from established white-collar unions
such as the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) in
the United States or the Association of Scientific, Technical and

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Managerial Staff (ASTMS) in the United Kingdom. This suggests that to the executive of these white-collar unions, it is both logical and reasonable that their membership should include individuals who are members of the armed forces.

What is less certain, however, is whether any created collectivity in the military is a white-collar union or whether it is a staff association. The distinction, as was noted above, is initially one of attitudes. The ideology of the white-collar union continues to reflect the notion of opposition. It is an instrumental ideology which stresses a utilitarian/calculative perception of organizational life. The staff association, on the other hand, is oriented to the values of consensus, emphasizing the normative/norm base of the organization. Whilst neither may endorse as valid a perception of the organization as a coercive institution which generates a sense of alienation among group members, there are nevertheless important differences of ideology and attitudes between the two types of group representation.

The persistent problem which arises here is that of evaluating the individual attitudes of servicemen and the attitudes of the group when some form of group representation is proposed. Structurally, it may be possible to conclude that any established form of group representation cannot be other than a staff association because it depends heavily for its existence upon the grace and favour of the employer. But this does not take into account the realities of attitudes, and there is ample evidence from developments in other sectors of the public service to suggest that over time staff associations drift towards the white-collar union model as the attitudes of activists change and harden.[12] Such evidence would imply that systems of group representation in the military even if they are established initially as staff associations, will become in time white-collar unions. Clearly where the initial pressure to unionize the military comes from established white-collar unions then from the very beginning the attitudes of those who join such groups will tend to reflect their preference for the ideology and values of a union rather than staff associations.

2. Relations between the Union and the Employer

Further analysis of this issue, however, depends on supplementing a structuralist approach with the consideration of the relations between the union and the employer. In other words, any conclusion must be based on what the union actually does. In this context, the critical variable is the way in which a union translates the general aim of 'protecting of furthering the interests of group members' into the precise objective of negotiating with the employer with a view to regulating wages and conditions of service.

Such regulation is frequently associated with that principle of free collective bargaining which is, in general terms, a central objective of trade unions in Western industrialized society. There are, however, significant international differences which stem from differences of culture and history. Fox, thus notes that international comparisons reveal marked differences in structures and modes of joint regulation.[13] But irrespective of these differences, unions persistently stress the importance of collective bargaining as a means of promoting the interest of group members. So the British white-collar union ASTMS in its evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill (1976) emphasized the importance of trade union participation in the determination of military pay and conditions :

> We should like to draw attention therefore to the
> fact that the Review Body system is a most
> unsatisfactory arrangement for determining pay
> and conditions since it cannot be truly
> independent and since it negates effective collective
> bargaining and all the benefits to be derived from
> mutually agreed settlements and understandings.

One important question which has to be asked, however, is whether military trade unions can become fully involved in collective bargaining. The latter normally embraces two areas of activity : the negotiating of improved terms and conditions of employment and, secondly, the settlement of procedural and substantive grievances. In the first area, improvements may be most effectively influenced by bringing pressure to

bear on political representatives or government ministers. To what extent, however, can such pressure in armed forces include those sanctions which are customarily exercized by economic unions ? With the single exception of Sweden, the right to strike, for example, is expressly witheld from military unions in Western Europe. Although Swedish military personnel, in common with other Swedish civil servants, have more limited negotiating rights concerning their working conditions than have employees in the private sector, they are allowed to use in negotiations the ordinary sanctions available to unions, that is, the right to strike. [14]

So far, no military union has called a strike. It has to be noted, however, that in 1971 when several unions affiliated to the Central Organization of Swedish Profession al Workers (SACO) were on strike, the National Swedish Collective Bargaining Office, representing the state as employer, formally declared that it intended to 'lock out' commissioned officers whose union, the Svenska Officers Forbundet (SOF), is affiliated to SACO. Since then, the unions have voluntarily agreed to submit proposed strikes to a government labour board for a ruling on the likely impact on national security.

It is the perceived potential effect of such a right to strike upon military capability and upon the external evaluation of military cerdibility, which has aroused the vehement opposition of many soldiers and civilians in those countries where military group representation is per se illegal, to any amendment of the existing law. In this respect, the general denial of such a right even in those countries where military unionism is legal, suggests that much opposition is not unwarranted. Werner, for example, draws attention to an often overlooked aspect of the alleged weakness of military unions in collective bargaining in the absence of a right to strike : [15]

> To negotiate, however, signifies discussion with
> a view to arriving at an agreement. The question
> that comes immediately to mind is to know what is
> to happen should the parties not reach any agreement
> - - - Trade-union strategy could very well profit
> from using a new international tension to negotiate

rigorously and militantly.   If this were to arise
one day, what could the government then do ?

What this implies is that once the right to negotiate in such areas as administrative ordinances, wage bargaining, conditions of service and so on, has been recognized, then the manifest and latent power of the military as a purposive organization becomes ipso facto a significant sanction.   It is the potentiality of this power which distinguishes the position of the military from that of other groups of civil servants, including the police, who may equally be forbidden to strike.   The military is, as it were, the 'power of last resort' and the ultimate question which arises is what action, if any, can be taken against a highly unionized military force that, irrespective of any legal prohibition against striking, exerts pressure upon the government in power.

In the settlement of procedural and substantive grievances, military unions may also face limitations which are not acceptable to unions in the private sector.   Firstly, they are unable to intervene in many areas of grievances.   Matters of an operational or organizational nature, for example, are normally excluded from the terms of reference of the military union.   Equally, activities are constrained by the normal regulations appertaining to military law and military discipline.   What this means in practice is that the informal structure of many industrial unions typified by shop stewards, is not found in the military union.   To a certain extent, however, this accords with the position in other white collar unions where shop stewards do not play a very prominent role. Secondly, it is clear that no machinery seems to exist for any immediate enquiry into a grievance, albeit that a formal structure has been created whereby grievances can be ultimately channelled through the military authorities, to the Ombudsman (Denmark, Germany, Norway and Sweden) or to political authorities.

There is, however, a major problem in establishing within the military organization a formal disputes procedure of the kind which is to be found in economic unions.   In establishing a procedural system, the two parties concerned create another social organization with its own division of labour, status relationships and power base.   It is an awareness of the possible dysfunctional consequences of such an

alternative organization which has prompted much of the opposition to the possible establishment of some form of group representation in the armed forces of the United Kingdom and the United States. Three points are consistently stressed :

a)   The existing responsibility of elected political representations towards members of the armed forces provides adequately for the settlement of disputes and grievances.

This attitude is forcefully expressed by U S Secretary of the Army, Martin Hoffman in his statement that every soldier has, as a practical matter, a Congressman and two Senators in addition to the military chain-of-command as his 'union'. [16]

b)   The existing chain-of-command of responsibilities in the military organization is adequately reinforced by an institutionalized and well established grievance procedure.

This conclusion, expressed frequently by many senior officers, emphasizes that it is the lack of adequate leadership which creates problems that necessitate the use of the established grievance procedure. The solution to any defined problem, it is argued, is the improvement of leadership rather than the establishment of an alternative disputes procedure.

c)   An alternative disputes procedure erodes command authority.

If the pre-conditions and the consequences of successful conflict regulation within the alternative organization are that the latter is congruent with the aspirations of both sides to the dispute, then they will have to share certain relevant values and norms. Such consensus, it is claimed, can be attained through the existing procedures, thereby suggesting that no innovation is required. If, on the other hand, there is no such consensus, then, since normative agreements cannot be established, the existing patterns of authority are

challenged by the alternative disputes procedure.

The British white-collar union ASTMS, however, has repeatedly stressed the advantages to be gained from trade union participation in this area.   In commenting upon proposals to amend that part of the Armed Forces Act which deals with the trial and punishment of offences, ASTMS draw attention to three specific advantages of unionization :

a)   It is seen as current good practice in labour relations elsewhere for trade unions to be involved in the drawing up of disciplinary and appeals procedures This practice, it is argued, could profitably be extended to the armed forces.

b)   A mutually agreed disciplinary procedure would safeguard service personnel against possible unfair and arbitrary decisions of commanding officers and would at the same time protect the officers in the exercise of their powers.

c)   Such a procedure should provide for each stage of disciplinary action to be notified to trade union representatives so that appropriate representations can be made on behalf of the person concerned.

In many respects, the difference of opinion as to these advantages and disadvantages is the crux of the debate about the merit or otherwise of unionization within armed forces.   Reconciliation of the two points of view is difficult, if not impossible, since the basis of the two proferred arguments is fundamentally different.   The supporters of the first point of view are primarily concerned with the question of effectiveness; the latter with the issue of social justice.   The former begin from the premise that one of the unique features of the military organization is the established hierarchy of command in which considerable emphasis is placed on the need to maintain discipline.   The tasks of armed forces as a crisis organization can, it is further argued, only be attained if the pattern of authority and discipline is kept inviolate.   Innovation within the structure is then limited to changes which modify but do not destroy this pattern, in the way in which the exercise of command has shifted from a system based on domination to one based on managerial

persuasion.   Nevertheless, the emphasis placed on the need for 'management' does not erode the basic hierarchical pattern of authority.

Supporters of the principles of unionization, within the military, however, start from an alternative premise.   Their argument is based on the primary objective of protecting the interests of the individual, even if such protection means that the traditional pattern of authority has to be replaced by 'a mutually agreed disciplinary procedure'.   The postulated hypothesis then argues that organizational effectiveness is enhanced by the protection afforded to the individual through the trade union structure.

This kind of debate is not only to be found within military organizations.   An extensive body of literature exists which draws attention to two contrasting value-systems.   The first of these reflects a strong preference for self-determination as against authoritarian control. Marshall, for example, refers to collective bargaining in terms of citizenship.   After defining political citizenship as the right to participate in the exercise of political power, he suggests that trade unionism has 'created a secondary system of industrial citizenship'.[17]   Other writers have argued that collective bargaining is integral to the very nature of social functioning and social values characteristic of Western society.[18]

The alternative value-system reiterates the importance of managerial prerogative, on the basis that such prerogative is in fact successful in furthering the objectives of the organization.   By accepting collective bargaining, those in power would commit themselves to compromise and to abandoning some aspects of their claim to managerial prerogative.   Consequently it is argued that when this claim is weakened, organizational effectiveness is submerged in a chaos of incompatible pressures and demands.   In short, the concept of prerogative must be retained to preserve the efficiency of the organization.[19]

One further point has to be stressed.   It is significant that in the armed forces of both the United States and United Kingdom, a preference is sometimes expressed for collective bargaining in a very limited area of market regulation, namely bargaining with the State as employer to improve rates of reward and selected conditions of service.   Such a

preference is often expressed by individual servicemen to whom the idea
of a military trade union is otherwise totally unacceptable. Their choice
is rationalized by their belief that such bargaining does not weaken the
claim to managerial prerogative nor question the legitimacy of the
established hierarchical structure. This attitude is not only to be found
within the armed services. One of the features of group representation
in the public service in a number of Western European countries has
been the use of trade union strategies in the furtherance of pay claims.
There is no reason to assume, however, that a system of collective
bargaining once it is established can continue to be so limited in its area
of enquiry, for, at the risk of gross over-simplification, it has to be
stressed that the choice is between the maintenance of the managerial
prerogative or the creation of the 'alternative organization'.

Since the implementation of collective bargaining is a basic
feature of trade union activity, its importance as a defining characteristic
of collectivities cannot be minimized. Its utility in two areas - the
negotiation of improved terms and conditions of employment, and the
settlement of procedural and substantive grievances - encourages the
establishment and development in economic organizations of craft,
industrial and general trade unions. Such unions, in time, reflect the
existence of two conflicting quasi-groups. In bureaucratic organizations,
the emergence of white-collar unions and staff associations equally
endorses the importance of the principle of collective bargaining. For
armed forces, however, the critical question is whether the very nature
of the hierarchical authority structure can accommodate the implementation
of this principle. Two contrasting conclusions can be noted. In the
first of these, the wish to maintain the managerial prerogative to ensure
organizational effectiveness rejects the claimed utility of collective
bargaining. In the second, however, a preference for the introduction
into the armed forces of principles of social justice, of self-determination
and 'industrial citizenship' is an argument in favour of introducing
collective-bargaining into the military.

3.   Political Activities of the Union

The evaluation of these contrasting conclusions, however, is
considerably affected by reaction to the involvement of trade unions in

political activities. To many servicemen, one of the less attractive features of trade unions is their propensity to become engaged in political activities. There are in this context, however, noticeable international differences which may modify the force of this reaction. In the United Kingdom, for example, evidence to justify servicemen's attitude can often be found in trade union rule books in their formal statement of the objects of the union. Thus, the British Transport and General Workers' Union (Rules : 1971, Rule 2e) states that the objects of the union shall include : 'The furtherance of political objects of any kind'. The Rules of the National Union of Mineworkers (Rules : 1947, rule 3s) lay down a more specific political aim :

> To join in with other organizations for the
> purpose of and with the view to the complete
> abolition of Capitalism - - -

It is, however, important to note that a political objective of this kind is not necessarily endorsed by all trade unions. The British Trade Union Congress in its evidence to the Royal Commission on Trades Unions and Employers' Associations (1966) recognized this :

> The trade union movement, comprising a whole
> spectrum of occupations from musicians to
> doctors, miners to shopworkers, obviously cannot
> formulate even a general list of objectives which
> are equally relevant to the competence of all its
> constituent unions or to the needs of all their
> members.

In other Western European countries, in contrast, the link between trade unions and political activity is less certain. Fleckenstein suggests that in West Germany, for example, the unions created after 1945 had as their objective the unification of all the gainfully employed in a single organization - 'independent ideologically and neutral politically'. In this respect, they differed considerably from the labour unions of the pre-1933 period which saw themselves mainly as economic communities of Socialist/Marxist workers in opposition to their employers.[20]

Notwithstanding these contrasts, contrasts which are further

exemplified in the distinction between the political activities of the
Catholic and Communist Trade Unions in many European countries or in
the distinctions posited between Swedish and American unions, it may be
that no organization can be truly apolitical. This would suggest that
any noted differences in the relationship between Trade Unions and
political activities are differences of degree rather than of kind. The
concern of servicemen and civilians with the potential effects of military
unions becoming involved in political activity can be rationalized as a
reaction against what are seen to be extremist political activities. The
latter can be defined in terms of the claim of the union to participate in
national government. Such a claim was made very explicit for example
by the British Trade Unions Congress in 1966 :

> Decisions affecting the interests of workpeople
> are made at a multitude of levels and in a
> multitude of ways. Workpeople's right to a
> view on matters which affect their interests
> applies therefore at the level of Government
> as well as at the level of firm or industry.
> The trade union claim to a voice in Government
> rests on the wide-ranging scope of modern
> Government.

Alternatively, it is evident that much civilian and service
reaction is based on the identification of political activities with radical
militancy. That such militancy can be a characteristic of a system of
group representation is evidenced in the early activities of the Dutch
conscript union, Vereniging voor Dienstplichtige Militairen (VVDM). The
radical VVDM has fought hard for the promotion of soldiers' rights as
have the Les comités de soldats in France.[21]

Given that all organizations are involved in political activities in
the sense that politics is concerned with who gets what, where and when,
the dominant question is whether military trade unions might axiomatically
become involved in 'extremist' political activity. This is an important
question. On the one hand, there is the issue of whether radical militancy
is that threat to the maintenance of the managerial prerogative within
armed forces which many servicemen envisage. On the other hand, the

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no less important issue is whether military trade unions which 'claim a voice in Governments' breach the principle that armed forces in Western society willingly accept a position of subordination to the civil power. In both instances, the force of societal reaction to the establishment of trade unions in armed forces can be identified with an awareness of the possible dysfunctional consequences associated with the involvement of the military in these areas of political activity.

Concern with the consequences for military organization of the establishment of trade unions as a form of internal group representation is therefore associated with those separate but independent aspects of unions : their structure, their relationship with the employer and their political activities. In the first of these, the issue is whether established military unions are comparable with economic collectivities (craft, industrial or general unions), white-collar unions or staff associations. In the second, the critical question is whether a union pre-occupation with the principle of free collective bargaining can be accommodated within the traditional authority pattern with its hierarchical structure. This is a particular area of controversy when the wish to negotiate terms and conditions of service implies the recognition of the right to impose sanctions such as the right to strike, or when an 'alternative organization' has to be established to implement an agreed disputes procedure. Finally, the political objectives which are implicit in the aims of many trade unions in the economic sector draw attention to the vexed question of military involvement in national politics, particularly when union political activity is identified with extremism.

Further information in this context can be derived from the analysis of the activities of collectives in European armed forces, but at this juncture it can be hypothesized that in these armed forces there are no unions which in terms of the three noted aspects of unionism, can be identified as comparable in their structure, role and functions with the craft, industrial or general trade unions which are to be found within Western economic organizations.

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14.   Annika Brickman, 'Military Trade Unionism in Sweden', *Armed Forces and Society* 2, 4 (Summer, 1976) p 534.

15. Victor Werner, 'Syndicalism in the Belgian Armed Forces', Armed Forces and Society, 2, 4, (Summer, 1976), p 487.

16. Army Times, 24th September, 1975, p 14.

17. T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class. (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1950) p 44.

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19. In a bureaucratic organization, such as the military, the reluctance to compromise and abandon some aspects of the managerial prerogative can be more readily understood when it is remembered that the very basis of a claim to higher positions in the authority structure is the ability to exercise that managerial prerogative.

20. Bernhard Fleckenstein, 'The Military and Labor Union Organizations in Germany', Armed Forces and Society, 2, 4, (Summer, 1976), p 499.

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Chapter III

Representative Committees

Before further consideration can be given to the activities in practice of trade unions in Western European armed forces, it is necessary to look briefly at the third form of group representation, that of representative committees.   Although far less attention has been paid to these committees than to either professional protective associations or to trade unions, such committees are, nevertheless, a most important means of responding to the demands of servicemen for some form of group representation.   Indeed, their ubiquity in Western European armed forces suggests that they have been found to be an alternative means of representing the needs of service personnel in a number of areas.

Within these armed forces it is possible to identify two contrasting categories of representative committees.   The first of these is part of the formal managerial structure for, as in other economic organizations, such committees represent a form of participation in decision-making with the aim of reducing inequality within the organization and of securing other socially valued objectives.   The second, in contrast, arises in opposition to the military organization, its aims and purposes being antithetical to those of the formal structure.   Both categories of representative committee, however, as examples of basic types of participation, reflect the interaction of two variables.   Figure 1 illustrates this :[1]

Figure 1 : Forms of Participation

		Scope of Decision-making	
		Goals and Means (Democratic)	Means only (Conservative)
Focal Level	Whole organization	A	B
	Small groups	D	C

Type A participation, exemplified by Yugoslav experiments in workers' control, is not to be found in Western European armed forces.

Type D however, can be identified with the previously noted second category of representative committees in these armed forces. Thus the unofficial and illegal Comités de Soldats in France, for example, favour freedom from management controls rather than an extensive share in decision-making. They are motivated by the belief that the goals of military organizations need to be changed, and that the established means whereby armed forces are managed are incompatible with the principles of contemporary industrial democracy.

In contrast, with these two types which represent a radical non-managerial viewpoint, the remaining types, B and C through their restriction of participation to the determination of means, amplify distinct managerial objectives. In military organizations, established formal representative committees can be initially identified as Type C. Underlying their establishment is the belief that participation of this kind does not erode the managerial prerogative. Effective performance in other words is not at the expense of the continued exercise of hierarchical authority, for representative committees, as Child notes, 'aim to "conserve" managerial prerogatives'.[2] The rationale underlying the activities of these committees is usually derived from the human relations approach to management as put forward by Mayo,[3] and from the group dynamics approach postulated by Lewin.[4] Both approaches, as will be seen later, are well represented in the 'Spokesman's Committees' and 'Contact Committees' which were established under the Danish Act of Rules of Co-Operation in the Armed Forces of June, 1967.

After the Danish 'Contact Committees' were established at regimental or equivalent level, their spokesman went on to establish a national committee which meets three times a year. This, and committees established under the 1972 Circular of the Ministry of Finance and Budgets governing collaboration between management and employees in all Danish state institutions, indicate that other representative committees in these armed forces may be identified with the Type B model of participation. Such a model equates with the now traditional model of joint consultation in economic organizations where, according to Richardson :[5]

Consultation ranges from informal talks with
the individual workers during the course of the
day's work, through systems by which representatives
of the workers, sometimes shop stewards, can put
their point of view before the management from
time to time, to regular formal representative
meetings of works councils and joint production
committees.

Since, however, as Parker and his colleagues note, joint
consultation on the whole in industry tends to be consultation at the work
place rather than near the boardroom,[6] it is perhaps not surprising
that formal representative committees in armed forces approximate more
closely to the Type C rather than Type B model of participation.[7] So in
Denmark as in France and, in a more limited sense, in the United Kingdom,
such committees are most likely to be found at local unit level where
direct action can be taken to alleviate sources of dissatisfaction and
thereby improve task performance.

Whereas, as has been noted, considerable attention has been paid
to the analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of trade unions in
armed forces, the potential of these representative committees has
received very little comment. This may be because such committees
are incorrectly seen to be of little account on the grounds that joint
consultation in industry is now widely accepted as a disappointment.[8]
This conclusion may be valid, however, only for economic organizations,
where the importance of workers' participation in management has been
limited by the alternative development of collective bargaining as a means
of protecting the interests and rights of workers. In bureaucratic
organizations, on the other hand, where there is little, if any, evidence
of that sense of class conflict which encourages the preference for
collective bargaining, managerial consultation with representation
committees may still be an important means of protecting individual and
group interests.

Alternatively, a reluctance to endorse the potential importance of
participation within armed forces may be derived from the fear that

participation, in common with other trade union activities, necessitates a 'zero-sum' view of power in organizations. An alternative perception, however, is that participation should be seen as a managerial technique which will enhance the effectiveness of performance. In this context, Lamemers among other theorists concludes that an increase in the power of lower-level employees is not necessarily at the expense of the power held by managerial personnel. [9] In other words, the managerial prerogative and, by extension, the chain-of-command in military organizations is not eroded by the formation of Type C systems of participation in the shape of representative committees.

A greater understanding and appreciation of this point can be achieved if some of the existing practices in Western European armed forces are looked at in greater detail. For the United Kingdom, representative committees exist within armed forces in a traditional yet organizationally embryonic form. Committees under such titles as the "Messing Committee" or the 'NAAFI Committee' (Navy, Army and Air Force Institute) ostensibly exist with very limited terms of reference. Since their membership comprises elected representatives, they are an embryonic form of the representative committee under consideration. Their practical importance, however, goes beyond this, for they tend to extend informally their area of responsibility to include the consideration of sources of dissatisfaction which are strictly outside their terms of reference. It is not suggested that this represents a radical innovation, or that such committees concern themselves fully with the means of management. What they do ensure frequently is that a forum is made available for the informal discussion of points of grievance or that they facilitate the bringing to the attention of commanding offices the attitudes and feelings of enlisted men and women.

The weakness of such committees is two-fold. Firstly, their informal extension of terms of reference often means that no executive decision can be taken on the matter raised because they are ultra vires. The failure to take such decisions can then increase rather than ameliorate a sense of dissatisfaction. Secondly, the ability of the committee to raise issues outside the legal terms of reference depends

upon the attitude of the officer who presides over such a committee. Any arbitrary exercise of managerial power in this context is entirely legal, but it does limit very considerably any concept of participation and to many servicemen these established committees are an unsatisfactory means of ensuring adequate group representation within the military organization.

The Danish system, in contrast, is both formal and institutionalized. Whereas all regular officers and men in the Danish armed forces, in common with other public servants, are represented by representational bodies, conscripts are not members of these organizations. For conscripted sergeants and enlisted men, however, representative committees have been established under the noted 1967 Act of Rules of Co-operation in the Armed Forces. Section 1 of the Act makes clear the basic purpose of the legislation :

> The objective is - through active co-operation - to
> promote the possibilities and individual growth of
> the individual, to strengthen mutual relationships,
> and thus to increase the efficiency of the Armed
> Forces.
>
> To meet this objective, it is laid down that :
>
> It rests with every commanding officer within the
> military defence organization to see to it that a
> system of co-operation is established which,
> according to the special circumstances within
> each individual unit is considered best suited to
> encourage a mutual co-operation among the
> various groups of personnel.

Although, this opening declaration acknowledges the discretion of the commanding officer, thereby minimizing any suggestion of the erosion of the managerial prerogative, the wish to implement active co-operation takes precedence. Accordingly, sections 2-14 of the Act detail the structure which has to be established by these commanding officers, although it is pointed out that the rules of co-operation do not affect the right of the individual to approach his superiors in accordance with the normal procedures associated with the military chain-of-command.

The created structure comprises four separate but functionally related representative committees. The first of them - the Spokesman Committee - is set up 'within the duty area of the immediate superior commanding officer',[9] that is, at company level. It consists of spokesmen elected according to an established procedure by 'election groups', with the commanding officer as chairman of the Committee. In their meetings, all questions concerning work within the company commander's area of respon sibility, other service matters and circumstances, social matters, welfare and off-duty measures may be discussed. There is this freedom to touch upon any subject, but matters with a high security classification or which are strictly personal to an individual are excluded from consideration. The latter phrase does not exclude the possibility of discussing an officer or NCO in relation to his men. Any matter which is not satisfactorily clarified can be passed on to the next level through the normal chain-of-command - if necessary to the level of the Minister of Defence.

At regimental or equivalent level, a second committee has to be set up in accordance with the Act : the Contact Committee. The composition, rules of procedure and terms of reference for the Committee are identical with those of the Spokesman Committee at company level. The elected representatives on both committees are trained either locally or at a post-experience training centre in the performance of their role, and all spokesmen are given time during working hours to discuss issues with the group which elected them.

After the Act was implemented, these spokesmen were able to exert pressure on the Ministry of Defence to set up a National Spokesmen's Committee comprised of 38 representatives of the larger garrisons. This committee which meets three times a year, then elects the six members of the Executive Committee of the Soldiers. Members of the latter are employed full time, and the Committee has wider and more far reaching power than the others, since it can make decisions which will not wait until the next meeting of the National Spokesman's Committee. This power is also recognized by the way in which the Executive Committee meets with the Danish Minister of Defence for joint discussions and by the appointment of members of the Committee to commissions and committees

set up by the Ministry, the Defence Command or the Staffs of the Services to consider such issues as pay and conditions of service.

Within the Danish Armed Forces, therefore, a structured hierarchy of representative committees for conscripts has been set up. Within the structure, formal rules of procedure have created a system in which issues for discussion are passed up through the various levels for further debate and in which decisions are reported back to lower-level committees for dissemination to individual service personnel.

The perceived success of these committees has also encouraged the extension of this type of group representation to cover the social needs of regular officers and enlisted men. Under the 1967 Act, commanding officers were encouraged to establish a representative committee for personnel other than conscripts, the composition of the committee taking into account the need to balance the interests of enlisted men on the one hand and NCOs and officers on the other. Subsequently, the 1972 Circular of the Ministry of Finance and Budgets Governing Collaboration within the Armed Forces established a mandatory representative system. The circular which applies to all state institutions, laid down rules governing collaboration between employees and management though involving representatives of professional associations (unions) within the Danish armed forces in Collaborative Committees. In accordance with these rules, a main committee has been established at Defence Command level, area committees at individual service levels and local committees at all local units.

The task of these committees is to ensure that the largest possible number of employees become involved in 'daily collaboration'. The committees are responsible for establishing and preserving exemplary working and occupational conditions within the organization, and increasing individuals' sense of security and well-being as well as their interest in improvements in operational efficiency. To effect this, the committees can deal with employment conditions, personnel matters, financial matters, request for information and the training of committee members. Normally, the committee comprises an almost equal number of representatives of the management and the employee associations.

The member of representatives on either side will be a minimum of three and a maximum of seven representatives, the primary object being that of ensuring that the composition of the committee is as representative of diverse interests as possible.

The Danish example has been dealt with at length because it is a classic, if not unique, example in Western European armed forces of the creation of a system of group representation on the basis that collaboration and consultation between interest groups is a necessary prerequisite of operational efficiency. The underlying philosophy draws heavily on the theories and practices of the Human Relations School of Management, and in a comprehensive training programme for spokesmen and for officers who will be interacting with these spokesmen, considerable attention is paid to the study of industrial psychology and sociology.

Although the Danish ideology has overtones of the German concept of Innere Fuhrung (Leadership and Civic Education),[10] the introduced sytem does reflect more general societal preferences within Denmark for such features of industrial democracy as "open government", 'worker participation' and 'power sharing'. It is therefore interesting to relate the established Danish system to that which was set up in Belgium. The Belgian government pre-empted other European developments when, in 1964, a Royal decree of 20th October established the Consultative Commission of Army, Air Force and Navy Personnel. This is an example of a Type B representative committee, for its composition and area of responsibility concern the Belgian Armed Forces as a whole. The commission comprises 42 members :

1. Six members nominated by the Ministry of Defence
2. Twelve members nominated by L'Association des Officiers en Service Actif (AOSM)
3. Six members nominated by La Royale Alliance Mutuelle des Sous-Officiers de Belgique (RAMSOB)
4. Six members nominated by l'Union Professionnelle des Sous-Officiers Belge (UPSOB)
4. Twelve members nominated by l'Association des Soldats et Coporaux de Carrière de Belgique (ASCCB)

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Under a chairman nominated by the Minister, the Commission must be consulted by the Ministry on :

> All questions of general interest relative to the statutory
> position of the three categories of the military who are
> party to the Commission.

Each association can ask the Minister to submit to the Commission for its opinion any such question, and although the Minister is not bound by the advice of this Commission, he is obliged under Article 18 of the Royal Decree to submit the question or to make known to the representatives of the Associations involved in discussions, the reason why his decision does not conform to the recommendations of the Commission.

The Commission thus provides a forum for consultation between the Minister and the various Professional Associations which represent Belgian servicemen. It clearly differs, however, from the Danish example. The latter is much more involved at the level of the small group and has created a far more complex structure. Moreover, the Belgian Consultative Commission is not able to exercise that degree of constraint upon the activities of the Minister which many servicemen feel is desirable. This is the persistent problem faced by consultative committees which can advise but cannot coerce the other party. Certainly, the subsequent creation in Belgium of alternative forms of negotiation and collective bargaining under the 1975 Law Concerning the Regulation of Discipline in the Armed Forces (1 February 1975) indicates that the creation of a Consultative Commission has not satisfied fully servicemen's demands for group representation.

The absence in the Belgian model of consultation at the local level is, however, avoided in the system of consultation which has been introduced within the French armed forces. In France, the classic attitude towards protecting the interests of servicemen was summed up in 1973 by a former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral de Joybert :[11]

> I am the union leader of the Navy, a union leader
> without affiliates nor union, a permanent shop steward - - -

Such a statement which is very reminiscent of those made by senior military officers in a number of other countries, re-affirms the

traditional belief that it is part of the duty of those who are in command to protect the financial and moral interests of their subordinates and to inform the political authorities of the latter's expectations.

Although this belief is accepted throughout Western European armed forces to be an essential feature of officership - as, indeed, it is in the United States - practical events have shown that a continual deterioration in the financial standing of the armed forces and an erosion of the former advantages of the military way of life, cannot be readily checked by the established system.   Dissatisfaction with the failure of the military establishment to protect effectively the interests of offices and enlisted men is thus a consistent characteristic of military attitudes in many Western countries.

Having recognized this, the French government took positive steps to create an alternative system of representation.   Initially, legislation of December, 1969 created the <u>Conseil supérieur de la fonction militaire</u> (CSFM).   Its terms of reference cover problems of a general nature relative to the standing and status of military personnel, to members not being elected but appointed by the drawing of lots.   The Council, however, in its original form was essentially an <u>advisory body</u> which represented regular commissioned and non-commissioned officers.   Since, it did not go so far as to be either a <u>consultative</u> or <u>participative</u> body, reaction to its claimed efficacy varied considerably.   On the one hand, the 'official' view point was that it was a major departure from traditional practice. Thus, J. C. Roqueplo, Contrôleur Général des Armées, claimed in 1972 that : [12]

> The formation of the CSFM goes beyond the simple
> organization of a new permanent way of spreading
> information; for the first time, the institution has
> some fundamental guarantee for military personnel
> on active service.

An alternative conclusion, on the other hand, was that an advisory body was too circumscribed either to meet fully the needs of servicemen or to protect the interests of offices and enlisted men.   This second conclusion, moreover seemed to be validated by the effects on the financial standing

of military personnel of a succession of restrictive financial budgets from 1971 through 1974.

Changes in the objectives and functions of the CSFM came in 1975. There followed a policy statement on 17th July, 1975 by the Minister of Defence which stressed that it was normal that commissioned and non-commissioned officers should be directly associated with any study or decision affecting their careers, status or financial position. [13] To achieve this end, consultative committees (Commissions consultatives) were to be set up under Army Regulations Article 72, 30th July, 1975 within every military unit. The committee chairman was to be the commanding officer, but in contrast with the Danish practice he was to appoint the other members to ensure adequate representation within the unit. At the same time, the central CSFM was re-organized with an increase in the number of members and a modification in the procedure of appointment.

The French consultative committee is thus an example of a Type C form of representative committee. It is noticeable, however, that there is no created organizational structure comparable with that to be found in Denmark nor is the concept of the election of representatives a part of the French system. Nevertheless, the latter is an important development, because it created both at local level and, more importantly at national level through the CSFM, an alternative to the existing chain-of-command. In short, military personnel are given, as in Denmark, two ways of 'expressing their difficulties, their aspirations and their concerns'. [14]

Les Comités de Soldats

The representative committees which have been discussed, are linked, despite differences in composition and function, by their status as part of the formal management structure. They are established on the premise that while organizational efficiency can be most readily achieved through the consultation of management with other interest groups, the basic thesis of the managerial prerogative is still maintained. The validity of this premise is not always accepted by military personnel. On the one hand, some officers and non-commissioned officers - particularly the latter - see the creation of representative

committees as a 'zero-sum' power game in which they have lost both power and status.   On the other, enlisted men contend that consultation is not enough since it is only concerned with means rather than with ends and means.   This attitude is noticeable in the Netherlands, where the conscripts represented by the VVDM want to put an end to all existing forms of consultation.   In pointing out the failure of consultation in practice, the VVDM has urged the creation of Employees Committees, empowered to deal with all matters directly concerning conscript life and work in the barracks. [15]

A comparable reaction from conscripts was also to be found in France.   Their exclusion from the CSFM distinguished their position from that of their counterparts in those other Western European forces where some system of group representation had been established. In these countries, conscripts are afforded protection within such a system, but in France conscripts, particularly in 1974-5, felt particularly deprived.   This is not to suggest that militancy of the kind, to be found in the VVDM, or, to a lesser extent, in Sweden is a persistent characteristic which can be ascribed to all conscripts.   In West Germany, as Fleckenstein notes, conscripts have shown no interest in associations modelled on the Dutch design or in any form of collective protest. [16]   In France, however, a militant campaign designed to exert pressure on the government and on senior military personnel led to the creation of informal and illegal soldiers' committees (comités de soldats).   The emergence of such unofficial committees is not a unique feature of contemporary armed forces.   Similar committees were to be found in the Cromwellian army; they were also a distinguishing characteristic of Russian armies in the period immediately following the 1917 Revolution.   The French comités de soldats, however, postulated certain specific objectives : [17]

1.   To secure the improvement of existing pay and
       conditions of service

2.   To protect individuals against the arbitrary power
       of the established hierarchy of authority within the
       French army.

3.   To create a syndicat des soldats notwithstanding the
       provisions of Articles 9 - 11 of the 1972 military law.

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4.   To promote links between soldiers and their fellow-
        workers.

These objectives and the advocated means of attaining them - street
demonstrations, go-slows and so on - indicate that the ideology of these
committees was derived from 'the politics of opposition'.   Essentially,
they were opposed to the maintenance of the managerial prerogative on
the grounds that as an interest group of workers, they were in conflict
with a military hierarchy which represented a bourgeois society.

The weaknesses of such committees were three-fold.   Firstly,
their structural form inhibited development.   Not only were they locally
organized, with the result that individual committees varied in the
emphasis which they placed on any single objective, but. since their
membership was transitory, they lacked a semblance of permanence.
Secondly, their radical extremism isolated them from wider support.
In this context, it is significant that in the expression of sympathy put
forward by some sections of established economic trade unions, the
rationale for the existence of these committees was closely identified
with the principles of human rights rather than the politics of opposition.[18]
Finally, these committees were outside both the management structure
and the trade-union structure.   This functional isolation can be contrasted
very markedly with the position of the created Danish representative
committees on the one hand where they form an important part of the
management structure, or the Belgian system on the other, where the
membership of the committee was based on nominations from established
professional associations / unions.

Although, as Mandeveille notes, the activities of these French
comités de soldats was a transitory phenomenon in the development of a
system of group representation in France, they are important as a
contemporary example of a form of representative committee.   It may
be that they achieved little since they fell into desuetude as reforms were
introduced into the French armed forces following the appointment of
General Bigeard to the Ministry of Defence in 1975.   Any failure of this
specific category of representative committee should not be ascribed,
however, to representative committees as a whole.   The Danish example,

in particular, is indicative of the manner in which such a committee can be established as an alternative to those forms of collective bargaining which are more conventionally associated with trade union activity. As such, the efficacy of consultative committees will be consistently criticized by those who would prefer to see the introduction into armed forces of unionism, for such a preference rejects the concept of collaboration between diverse interests. Given that such criticism exists, it nevertheless has to be emphasized that the establishment of representative committees which facilitate consultative and collaboration between interest groups may go a long way to meeting demands for the establishment of group representation within the contemporary military.

Notes and References

1. This figure and the subsequent discussion is based on John Child, The Business Enterprise in Modern Industrial Society (London : Collier-Macmillan Ltd. , 1969) p 89.

2. Child, op cit, p 90.

3. See Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization (New York : Macmillan, 1933), and The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization (Boston, Mass : Havard University Press, 1945).

4. See D. Cartwright and A. Zander, Group Dynamics : Research and Theory (New York : Harper & Row, 1960).

5. J. H. Richardson, An Introduction to the Study of Industrial Relations (London : Allen & Unwin, 1956) p 121.

6. S. R. Parker et al. , The Sociology of Industry (London : Allan & Unwin, 1967) p 136.

7. Although figure 1 indicates that four types of participation can be treated separately for purposes of analysis, hybrid arrangements will logically be found in practice (Child, op cit p 89 n 3). The Danish example can be seen therefore, as a Type C/B mix in which the tendency is for greater importance to be attached to participation at the small group level, that is, in military units smaller in size than the regiment.

8. H. A. Clegg, A New Approach to Industrial Democracy (Oxford : Blackwell, 1960) p 109.

9. C. J. Lammers, 'Power and Participation in Decision-Making in Formal Organizations'. American Journal of Sociology 73, 2 (September 1967) pp 201-16.

10. A large body of literature is concerned with this concept of Innere Fuhrung. Pane Klein, Ekkehard Lippert and Tjarck Rossler, Bikliographie : Bundeswehr und Gesellschaft 1960-1975 (Munich: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, 1978) list 147 references. A major commentary is, Wolf Graf von Baudissin, Innere Fuhrung. Der Veriuch einer Reform in Stiftung F. V. S zu Hamburg (ed.) Freiher - von - Stein - Preis, 1964. (Hamburg, 1965).

11. Cited by Lucien Mandeville, 'Syndicalism and the French Military System', Armed Forces and Society, 2, 4 (Summer, 1976) p 540.

12. J. C. Roqueplo, 'Perspectives actuelle de l'evolution de la function militaire en France'. Révue de Défense Nationale (March, 1972).

13.   Cited by Mandeville, op cit, p 546.

14.   ibid.

15.   Nota Personeelsraden, October 1975.   (Note on the Employees
       Committees)   (Amsterdam : VVDM, 1975)

16.   Fleckenstein, 'The Military and Labour Union Organization in
       Germany',   Armed Forces and Society, 2, 4 (Summer, 1976),
       p 513.

17.   These objectives are deduced from the publications - mainly
       mimeographed broadsheets - of the various soldiers committees
       which came into being after June 1974.

Chapter IV

.The Mood to Unionize

The previous discussion on the possible structure and function of systems of group representation within Western European armed forces illustrates the diversity of reasons which prompt and rationalize the establishment of such systems. It is also evident that no single model can accommodate the variety of attitudes towards unionization which exist within national armed forces, for these reflect major differences in culture, experience and socialization. At the risk, however, of gross over-simplification, it can be suggested that the mood to unionize can be identified with the separate categories of direct and indirect motivation.

Direct Motivation

Under this heading we can attribute the mood to unionize to the presence of one or more of the following factors :

1. Dissatisfaction with pay and conditions of service.
2. Dissatisfaction with existing procedures for the redress of complaints.
3. A wish to improve the existing status of military personnel.
4. A wish to participate in decision-making.
5. A demand for power-sharing both within the military organization and in national government.
6. The belief that an organization representing a homogeneous group can more readily exert pressure on the legislative and executive.

It is evident that not all servicemen will be equally affected by the possible presence of these factors. Previous research in another context has shown that grade and career commitment are the social factors which are most likely to affect attitudes within the armed forces.[1] Consequently the sources of dissatisfaction noted above can be grouped in a number of ways. If the major sources of dissatisfaction,for example, are seen to be internal to the military organization, then the mood to unionize might encourage the emergence of a union in which officers and senior NCOs

are defined as an interest group of "management" while enlisted men are seen as the "workers". The establishment of grievance and abritration procedures would then change the nature of established relationships within the military chain of command.[2] Alternatively, if the major sources of dissatisfaction stem from political decisions which affect such areas as pay and conditions of service, then the military organization as a whole might be identified as the bargaining unit.

It is this disparity of attitudes which is a persistent feature of the mood to unionize. It also has a major effect on any evaluation of the effects of unionization upon the internal operations of the military organization. Segal and Kramer illustrate the dilemma which arises very clearly :[3]

> Personnel in higher grades, and career-oriented personnel, were more likely to feel that unions would have a negative effect on discipline and on superior-subordinate relations, to feel that professionalism and mission effectiveness would decline, and that unions could not insure respect for human dignity, nor look after the rights of personnel by helping resolve disputes through direct negotiation with the Army, than were personnel in lower-grades, and non-career respondents. In short, while there was widespread feeling that unions could help relate the Army to the civilian government, there was great concern about the impact of unions on the internal operation of the Army, and this latter concern was voiced most strongly by those who in fact had the most to gain in the long run by improvements in military pay and benefits.

Sources of Dissatisfaction

A general conclusion which can be reached is that throughout Western European armed forces, with the possible exception of West Germany, a major source of current dissatisfaction is the state of military pay and conditions of service. This concern with the way in which armed forces have been treated by society and national governments in terms of both pay and status permeates all ranks. In the United

Kingdom, for example, such a feeling of dissatisfaction was first expressed in the early 1970s. The Spencer Report thus commented that in 1975 in its investigation into Army Welfare, members of the Committee had encountered the expression of considerable dissatisfaction :[4]

> Other persons did not understand the purpose of the
> rent rebate scheme and thought it clear proof that the
> Army's lower ranks were underpaid and below the
> poverty line ; whilst some pointed to rates of pay
> (usually obtained from newspaper reports), for civilian
> jobs which were apparently similar to Army employment
> and cited them as evidence that comparability of pay had
> not been achieved in practice.

Two years later, the expression of discontent among airmen in the Royal Air Force received considerable media coverage. Here the central cause of dissatisfaction was summarized in the comment that skilled technicians, ' would be better off on the dole (welfare payments) or alternatively, would be earning twice as much in any similar civilian job'.[5] Under the heading, "Angry RAF Wives Demand More Pay for Our Men", one newspaper reporter commented :[6]

> RAF wives are tired of scrimping and saving and living
> on orange boxes - - - and for what.

The general sense of dissatisfaction was based on the premise that the all-volunteer force had been forgotten in 'regulation poverty', whereas other workers in the public sector were able to obtain more pay through taking, or threatening to take, some form of industrial action. It was stressed that servicemen wanted some recognition of their efforts :[7]

> While they are being shot at in Belfast or Belize,
> t hey expect to be paid enough to support their
> family in something better than a military slum.

It is important, however, to note that this sense of dissatisfaction is primarily associated with a feeling of relative deprivation. Before 1970, the pay structure in the British armed forces was so complex that individuals were unable to calculate their emoluments. Thus a 1979

Survey prepared as part of the Second Report of the Standing Reference on the Pay of the Armed Forces, indicated that 44% of officers and 51% of enlisted personnel were unable to calculate their pay within 10%. One result of this was that pay comparability was virtually impossible, and a sense of relative deprivation - where it existed - was rarely associated with an awareness of service and civilian pay differentials. The military salary which was introduced in 1970, however, encouraged evaluation of this differential for it was created on the basis of pay comparability. Moreover, the emphasis which was placed within the armed forces on the growing convergence of military and civilian skills also encouraged servicemen to seek out a reference group with whom they could identify. Accordingly, the stress placed on comparability of pay, skills, conditions of service, roles, and functions led many servicemen to compare life in the military with life in civilian occupations.

Whether such comparison correctly led to the conclusion that military personnel were at least 20% behind civilians in terms of pay and that 'fringe benefits' in civilian occupations were superior to those enjoyed in the armed forces, is largely an academic issue. What is much more important is that a sense of dissatisfaction was very apparent in 1977 because it was generally believed that civilians were much better off. As Major-General P.C.R. de C. Martin, Colonel of the 22nd (Cheshire) Regiment wrote to the press :[8]

> Let there be no doubt in anybody's mind that the
> morale of servicemen today is more brittle than
> senior officers, past or present, can ever
> remember. One more straw in the shape of
> further cuts in defence spending, or injustice,
> real or apparent, in pay could break the camel's
> back.

The question which interested the media was whether the 'last straw' would encourage servicemen to seek unionization.[9] Wives of servicemen had already formed the Forces Wives Association (see Annex A to this Chapter) which in view of the legal restrictions placed on unionization within the British armed forces, existed to exert pressure on the Ministry of Defence. Yet despite the deeply felt sense of 'having

been let down' by politicians, no strong commitment to unionization among servicemen could be detected.

This was in complete contrast to Belgium where a sense of deprivation led servicemen to seek more power for their professional associations and where a specific objective of military syndicalists after 1972 was to raise minimum living standards, obtain allowances equal to those of other state employees, be paid overtime and increase certain allowances such as flying pay, disturbance allowance and so on. The British example, however, is very reminiscent of attitudes held by regular servicemen in France. Although conscripts, as has been seen, were prepared to go to the extent of forming soldiers' committees, their regular counterparts were not so motivated. In France, as in the United Kingdom, a continuing identification of the military career as some form of vocation meant that despite a persistent decline in the financial standing of members of the armed forces, many servicemen continued to be opposed to military unionization.

In the armed forces of the United States, the attitudes of many servicemen also replicate those of their French and British colleagues. Evidence in the pages of the Army Times, for example, is indicative of a growing sense of dissatisfaction in such areas as pay limitation, reduction in medical benefits, and threats to retirement pay. Moreover, policy statements such as that of the Assistant Secretary of Defence for Manpower have done little to satisfy such complainants. [10]

> We must slow the growth of defence manpower costs in
> order to assure an adequate level of resources for
> development, procurement - - - and the operation of
> our forces.

Yet, as Pillsbury points out in discussing trends in military compensation and benefits : [11]

> The issue itself has probably received more attention
> than it deserves amidst the contemporary speculation
> over military unionization. Erosion of benefits may
> be a cause of discontent, but, more importantly, it is
> a symptom of important changes in the perception of
> service personnel about their profession.

Certainly, the researches of Segal and Kramer [12] or of Manley and his colleagues [13] indicate that servicemen are divided in their assessment of the degree to which a military union would prevent the erosion of fringe benefits and secure higher pay rises for military personnel, even though there may be more general agreement that causes of discontent do exist.

What this suggests is that in these countries the preferred norm of behaviour in the military is far removed from the utilitarian and calculative attitudes attributed to workers in the private sector. The dimensions of this ideal norm are clearly indicated in the following quotation : [14]

> The military career is not taken up to get social security.
> When they chose Saint-Cyr, they take a vow of poverty.
> No young man is attracted to the profession of arms by the
> 'mess - tin'. Officers have always despised money.

Not all servicemen will endorse this. There will be a number who will argue that only through unionization can the military attain a rate of reward which is fair and equitable. When, however, they are seen by their fellows as deviants, then it can be surmised that the general preference for the maintenance of traditional norms is sufficient to constrain the demand for unionization, notwithstanding the general presence of a sense of relative deprivation.

This is not to suggest that such a sense of dissatisfaction does not give rise to other dysfunctional consequences. The British experience, in particular, suggests that highly qualified military personnel with skills that can be readily transferred into civilian occupations tend when they are dissatisfied with pay and conditions, to leave the armed forces. Since this group are less likely in any event, to endorse the validity of the traditional norms of behaviour, the result is that those who remain within the military organization are a group who tend to exemplify expected attitudes. In turn, they emphasize the validity of their opposition to unionization thereby encouraging more technicians to seek a move into civilian occupations. The possible effect of this is cogently expressed by Janowitz in a discussion of the potential for internal rigidity and a sharper boundary between the military and the civilian sector : [15]

An in-bred force, which could hold resentments
towards civilian society and could, accordingly,
develop a strong and uniform conservative political
ideology, would in turn influence professional
judgments.

In short, dissatisfaction with pay and conditions of service may
not only result in the demand for unionization.   In affecting recruitment
and retention rates, it may also have a long-term effect on existing
patterns of civil-military relationships by encouraging the emergence of
an in-bred force composed of individuals with strongly held traditional
norms and values.   If such a group then resents the way in which it has
been apparently neglected by the political power, this may affect, as
Janowitz suggests, the expression of professional judgments.   In addition,
this sense of resentment may be associated with a feeling of isolation and
a growing mood of alienation.   Although this may not engender a demand
for unionization, it nevertheless creates problems of low morale which,
in turn, can affect the capability of the armed forces to carry out their
tasks effectively.

Grievance Procedures

Whereas a sense of dissatisfaction with pay and conditions of
service may encourage individuals to seek alternative employment in the
civil sector, dissatisfaction with grievance procedures is more likely to
continue as a persistent irritant since few servicemen will leave the armed
forces for this reason alone.   This does not mean that any failure to
establish such procedures within the military organization is of little
account.   It has previously been noted that civilian trade unions which
seek to include service personnel within their membership, are quick to
point out that the establishment of mutually agreed grievance and
procedural systems is one of the major advantages of military unionization.
But since dissatisfaction with the existing systems is more likely to be an
individual rather than group reaction, this source of dissatisfaction within
the military seems on first examination to create less demand for
unionization than the feeling of being unjustly treated in terms of pay and
conditions.   Notwithstanding, therefore, the persuasive arguments of

civilian unions such as ASTMS in the United Kingdom, the willingness of servicemen to continue in the military organization despite their feelings about the inadequacy of grievance procedures may, at first, lead us to overlook the extent to which these feelings reflect a persistent sense of dissatisfaction.

Obviously, many politicians and officers, particularly senior officers, will reject the validity of a conclusion that established procedures are inadequate. A commonly held view is that the legal definition of rights and obligations within the military organization, reinforced by the emphasis placed within a bureaucracy on rational - legal administration and the rule of law, provide adequately for the protection of individuals. When to this is added the safeguard provided by access to the political representatives of service personnel, then, it is argued, no additional system of grievance procedures is either necessary or warranted.

Any evaluation of this conclusion is fraught with difficulties. The whole question is a very emotive one, for to an even greater extent than when discussing pay and conditions of service, critical analysis is interpreted as a criticism of such jealously guarded military mores, as the norms of leadership, the values of custodial management ('looking after your men'), and the intrinsic impersonal rationality of the bureaucratic system. The additional problem is that much of the evidence published in support of the conclusion that existing procedures are inadequate is equally emotive. Thus the French comités de soldats in drawing attention to the conscripts' grievances, tended to link their argument that the machinery for dealing with these was inadequate, to the hypothesis that such inadequacy was both a cause and effect of class conflict within the military organization. The Dutch conscript association Bond voor Dienstplichtigen (BVD), similarly sought the reform of existing rules of military justice as part of a package of demands originating in ideological opposition to the structure and function of armed forces in contemporary society.

An objective analysis of the problem, however, is provided by Taylor and Arrango. Their analytical premise is succinctly stated : [16]

To argue that unionization would assist individuals in resolving grievances is to assert that the existing vehicles for grievance resolution are ineffective or that commanders are unwilling or unable to resolve grievances when they arise.

They suggest that the possible ineffectiveness of established grievance procedures within the military can be accounted for in the following ways :

1. The existing chain of command which is identified as the vehicle for submitting grievance procedures is not only a channel of information but also the structural base of authority. Individuals may therefore be reluctant for a number of reasons to submit grievances through this channel.

2. Most sources of grievance cannot be readily solved within this chain of command. The required decisions are often beyond the legal competence of the internal authority structure.

3. Established advisory bodies have no statutory authority to solve grievances. They merely advise a commander who is neither required nor obliged to act on this advice.

4. Grievance procedures are structured to resolve individual rather than group grievances. The expression of the latter may be illegal by existing military law.

To these explanations may be added :

5. The non-representation of the individual in the submission of grievances, places a member of the armed forces at a considerable disadvantage in quasi-legal administrative procedures.

Although this may, at first, appear to 'prove' that existing grievance procedures within the armed forces are inadequate, it does not necessarily follow that such inadequacy encourages the development of military unionization as a way of providing an alternative structure.

Although it can be argued that union involvement could do several things to improve the present system of grievance procedures, there remains the very real danger that such involvement creates an habitual system which subjects legitimate orders and instructions to questioning and interpretation. This premise reflects the conclusion that any created alternative structure must axiomatically lead to the questioning of all, not some, of the orders and decisions of the legitimate and established chain of command. In other words, what is seen by one individual to be the lawful exercise of authority is seen by another to be the source of a grievance.

What is perhaps significant in this context is that those alternative structures for the resolution of grievances which have been established, are not necessarily located in conventional union structures. Thus in West Germany, the Bundeswehr serviceman can turn to the Parliamentary Commissioner of the Federal Armed Forces if he feels that his rights have been infringed. This military 'ombudsman' is an independent parliamentary institution which the serviceman can address without going through the usual channels. Moreover, the annual average of 7,000 requests which the Parliamentary Commissioner receives indicates that this structure acts as a very effective " social early warning system" well suited to drawing legislative and executive early attention to undesirable conditions and suggesting their elimination . [17]

The French counterpart to the German military ombudsman is the Conseil permanent du service militaire (CPSM). With a membership of two Senators, two Deputies, four regular commissioned or non-commissioned officers and four other suitable persons, the CPSM was established to give conscripts a chance to voice their grievances. It thus complements the Conseil supérieur de la fonction militaire (CSFM) created in December, 1969 to protect the interests of regular servicemen. All these bodies are 'imported' in the sense that they are located neither within the established authority structure nor within an alternative trade union structure. As such, they may be an answer to the charge that the only alternative to the former must lead to the questioning and criticism of lawful orders and instructions. Nevertheless, it has to be questioned

whether these two bodies meet the demand for the resolution of
individual as opposed to group grievances.   These, it can be argued,
are essentially consultative bodies which do not provide an effective
alternative to the redress of grievance through the normal military
chain of command.

What all of this suggests, therefore, is that when seeking to
establish alternative strategies for the settlement of grievances. the
dilemma of reconciling the needs of the individual and the needs of the
organization is not readily resolved.   The continuing issue is whether
existing vehicles for grievance resolution are indeed so ineffective that
they motivate the promotion of military unionization as a means of
providing alternative structures.   Analysis suggests that most expressions
of discontent with established procedures for grievance resolution are
highly personal.   It is evident that dissatisfaction with existing grievance
procedures will rarely influence an individual's decision to leave the
military organization.   Nevertheless, the noted research into the attitudes
of military personnel indicates clearly that there is evidence of a general
criticism of established procedures.   Manley and his colleagues thus
note that within their sample of almost 1,000 USAF officers and enlisted
personnel, the second and third most potent predictors of positive attitudes
towards unionization in the armed forces reflected the perceived need for
third party representation in grievance procedures and the perception that
a military union could solve problems which an individual could not solve
on his own.   They suggest that these indicators are of importance because
they seem to share a common theme of perceived individual impotence in
dealing with the military establishment. They continue : [18]

> Possible explanations of the significance of these
> two variables include the perception of the military
> as a rule-bound bureaucracy, perceived indifference
> on the party of military leaders, and further evidence
> of the emergence of individualism within our society.

Segal and Kramer, however, addressed themselves more
specifically to the issue of whether a military union could, in fact, look
after the interests of military personnel by helping to resolve disputes
through direct negotiation with the army.   Using a modified version of

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the research instrument used by Manley and his colleagues, Segal and Kramer note that less than one-third of their respondents felt that unions could resolve disputes through such negotiation. Two contrasting conclusions are thus presented. The first indicates that an awareness of the unsatisfactory state of existing procedures predisposes individuals to favour military unionization. The second concludes that there is still considerable doubt about the efficacy of such unions in grievance resolution.

The contrast between these two conclusions is very understandable. What they suggest is that the imperfections of the existing structures are recognized as an irritant. It is, however, far from certain that military unions per se can provide an effective alternative answer to the stated problem. In this context, as has been stated, many servicemen are worried lest union involvement in this area interferes to an unacceptable extent with the established chain of command. It is this point which is overlooked in those arguments which stress that the military union does not create the grievance but only responds to the needs of the individual. While this is true, such arguments fail to consider the extent to which any postulated solution still has to accommodate the need within the military organization for the continuance of a structured hierarchy of authority as a defining functional characteristic. The evidence which is available suggests that in this context a distinction may have to be drawn between the immediate and the delayed investigation of a grievance. To facilitate the latter, a member of alternative means can be created. The representative committee favoured by the Danes, the principle of the Ombudsman as it was instituted in West Germany or the French model of consultative committees are all possible solutions to this problem. The cardinal question which then arises is whether any one of these is more or less effective than those established procedures which form part of the established chain-of-command. It is, however, in the second area of providing for the immediate investigation of a grievance that the major difficulties arise. In economic organizations, it is commonly accepted that a shop steward or other worker representative can intervene readily in support of the affronted individual. In crisis organizations, however, it is more generally argued that such intervention would not only question the legitimacy of the established authority structure but

also interfere with task attainment. The question which consistently arises, therefore, is whether a crisis organization, such as the military can establish any means of solving immediate grievances other than through the established chain-of-command without destroying the very raison d'être for which the organization exists.

The Improvement of Status.

A common feature of individual attitudes within the contemporary military organization is the belief that the prestige of armed forces has declined over the past several years. Thus Manley and his colleagues found that a substantial number of their research sample of officers and enlisted men felt that the military had lost status.[19] A cardinal feature of the complaint of these servicemen, however, is the belief that at some time in the past, the prestige of the military was high. Whether this can be evidenced by fact is problematical. Occupational prestige ranking scales in the United States, for example, indicate that in the two National Opinion Research Center (NORC) surveys of 1947 and 1963, a 'captain in the regular army' was ranked well below free professionals or government employees, while the prestige of a 'corporal in the regular army' was equated with that of a machine-operator in a factory or a garage mechanic.[20]

The analysis of this point, is therefore, fraught with difficulties. Apart from the methodological imperfections of such surveys, there are considerable cultural and historical variations in Western European experience which make it impossible to arrive at other than generalized conclusions. Even then, what may be a true evaluation of occupational status for a given rank in a particular country at a specific point in time may be far from universally applicable. What is much more important in this context, however, is the sense of relative deprivation felt by servicemen in contemporary armed forces, for it is this sense, irrespective of its factual accuracy, which predisposes some servicemen to look to unionization as a means of improving their current status. Werner brings this out very clearly when he comments that :[21]

> The Belgian professional soldier of today is dissatisfied
> - - - rightly or wrongly, he feels deprived and
> disadvantaged.

The immediate question which arises, however, is what service personnel mean by 'status' The concept of status is one of those major sociological categories which has attracted considerable investigation and analysis thereby producing an extensive theoretical discussion as well as a rich variety of empirical evidence.   Notwithstanding complex problems of definition, it is generally agreed that subjective assessments of status refer to that prestige or honour which is designated as one of the three basic rewards which are differentially distributed in any group or society. In this context, the serviceman is initially affected by his perception of occupational prestige, concluding, rightly or wrongly, that such prestige has declined in recent years.   Individuals further identify status with an interpretation of their personal prestige within society as a member of the armed forces, often concluding once again, that this has diminished over time.

If the concept of status is defined in this way, it is very questionable whether military unionization will enhance either individual or group prestige.   Indeed it may very well be that the promotion of unionism diminishes that status, since membership of a military union is seen within society to be an erosion of that professionalism which justifies existing status evaluation.   It is, however, possible to relate the concept of status to that source of prestige which Eisenstadt in discussing the basic components of social stratification, has termed.[22]

> The ability of controlling the collectivity, of
> representing it, of defining its goals and its
> central activities and symbols, or in other
> words to be in a sense in its 'centre''.

Given that the 'collectivity' may be defined as the politico-military complex, it can be deduced that the concern of these servicemen is derived from their feeling that they are increasingly excluded from participation at the centre.   Their self-image is that of marginal men existing on the periphery of decision-making no longer able to define military goals, control activities and symbols. let alone control the workings of the politico-military relationship.

Eisenstadt is quick to point out that although this notion of 'centrality' is very often closely related to the possession of 'power', the two are not analytically identical.[23] What we are witnessing here therefore is not a reaction to the loss of political power, with all the attendant controversy about the extent to which armed forces may or may not have such power in reality, but a sense of status deprivation associated with this loss of centrality. Now in this context, it may indeed be possible to argue that some form of military collectivity can exert pressure as an interest group upon the political power. The interest group, moreover, may be more effective than an individual in persuading the political power to accept military participation in those areas of decision-making which affect the armed forces. What remains uncertain, however is what is the most effective form for this presure group to take.

The general premise which can be put forward is that some type of professional association rather than a military union, is in theory more likely to effect an improvement of status. Although some national governments in Western Europe have agreed, as in Belgium, that the competent authorities cannot without preliminary negotiations with the representatives of the military unions, legislate for the armed forces in agreed areas,[24] it is evident that such negotiations do not have the force of conventional union activities in the economic sector. The implication is that irrespective of the name adopted by the representative association, relationships between the association and the government are conducted according to rules which are derived fromthe activities of professional associations rather than unions. The rationale of this is that the politics of cooperation in contrast with the politics of confrontation are more likely to be of utility in securing the protection of the self-interests of the military. The point is admirably illustrated in West Germany. Of the two representative associations within the Bundeswehr, the Deutsche Bundeswehr-Verband (DBWV) as a professional-oriented organization which rejects a course of confrontation with the employer and seeks a position of neutrality in party politics,' seems to be better qualified to represent the social and professional self-image of the military and their interests'.

The question which remains unanswered, however, is whether the status of the military in contemporary society can in practice be improved through the intervention of a representative association. Given that the notion of 'status' is linked to the issue of centrality, then much of the discussion in this area takes the form of a debate about two competing status models : the apolitical warrior versus the soldier-statesman In the former, the characteristics of Huntington's military professionalism suggest that the status of the military is dependent upon the armed forces withdrawing from participation in major policy-making decisions and restricting their activities to those traditionally defined as strictly military. Since civilians are equally expected to refrain from interfering in purely military matters, the status of the military is then derived from its relative autonomy, specialized competence and crucial elements of group cohesion.

The soldier-statesman model, in contrast, argues that the fusion of military considerations with other aspects of national policy, necessitates the involvement of the armed forces in the centrality of decision-making. This thesis with its undertones of that inter-penetration of the political and military elite which was inter alia a feature of the Victorian Army in the United Kingdom, suggests that the status of the military is considerably improved when participation is identified with the central rather than peripheral position of the military. Enhanced status, in effect, is associated with the emergence of a more politically sophisticated military, prepared and willing to provide 'their best judgement on economic, political and psychological matters as well as strictly military matters'.[27]

Irrespective of which these models is accepted as valid, it can be surmized that in neither case will the implementation of military unionism result in an improvement of status. At best as has been pointed out in the reference to the activities of the DBVW in West Germany, a profess-ional association can act to represent the existing status position of the armed forces. In both models, however, it is the development of military professional skills which are important and it can be inferred that it is attributes of this professionalism which will be the major determinants of status.

It can also be argued that military unionism will have a negative effect on occupational prestiges. This may be particularly so if military service is identified increasingly as an occupation legitimated in terms of the marketplace rather than as a profession characterized by its high level of skill, degree of self-regulation and a strong element of corporate cohesion. It is in this context, that the preference among some officers and enlisted personnel for the promotion of military unionism to effect improvements of pay and conditions of service, overlooks the dysfunctional consequences of such unionism. While it may result in immediate improvements in these areas, the long-term effect is more likely to be a further loss of occupational prestige with all its attendant consequences for the armed services in such areas as resource allocation, civil-military relationships and enhanced political control.

Indirect Motivation

Of the factors which have been identified as directly motivating service personnel to seek some form of group representation, three have a universal applicability. Throughout Western Europe it is evident that dissatisfaction with pay and conditions of service, a preference for alternative grievance procedures and a search for improved status, predispose military personnel to participate in either a military union or protective professional association. The remaining factors are less generally applicable. Essentially they are concerned with a demand for some form of political participation whereby the military can assert or reassert its right to be involved in power-sharing. As such they go beyond Eisenstadt's concept of 'centrality' for while this is previously associated with status, the listed factors are concerned with the distribution of power within society.

In some instances, it is possible to detect a direct relationship between military unionization and the search for political power. As has been noted, the activities of the Dutch conscript unions, particularly the BVD, are a positive reflection of an attempt to secure political power. This is, however, an extreme example and in all instances the link between unionization and the search for political power will be shaped by the national political culture. Thus in West Germany, the positive attempts

of government to ensure that servicemen participate in politics as 'citizens in uniform' are exemplified not only through the encouragement given to servicemen to belong to unions but also through the implementation of a policy whereby military personnel are encouraged to be members of both national and local legislatures.

In contrast, the American and British identification of the armed services as an apolitical force materially affects the perception of the link between military unionization and political power. Whereas unions in the civil sector may be associated - particularly in the United Kingdom - with a search for political power, military personnel by and large react to the suggestion that military unionization should be a means of securing power. Their apolitical self-image is such that a search for political power is not generally accepted to be a valid motivation for seeking the establishment of some form of group representation. In other words, the national political culture, reinforced by the military self-image, defines the extent to which the search for political power is linked to the demand for military unionization.

At the same time, dissatisfaction with government is a widespread characteristic of military attitudes throughout Western Europe. Such dissatisfaction is thus a very common indirect motivation for military unionization, for it stems from the often expressed feeling that 'the government has let the armed forces down'. It relates, however, not to those direct motives of unionization which are primarily personal in origin, but to more generalized conclusions that the civil power is not prepared to afford armed forces those resources or recognition which are necessary to secure task attainment. The erosion of military budgets, the cancellation of advanced weapons systems, the apparent preference for the furtherance of social welfare objectives and so on are seen as symptoms of a national neglect of the importance of armed forces within the modern industrialized society. Somehow, it is sometimes concluded, the establishment of a system of group representation is the only way to reverse what is seen as a persistent trend

What this suggests, is that a feeling of deprivation will encourage a mood that favours a form of unionization. This, as has been noted, was

an important feature of the Belgian situation where such a mood gave rise to the development of a complex system of group representation. It can, however, be argued that it is the direct causes of demand for unionization which act as a catalyst and that the indirect motivation only, in effect, reinforces the impact of more personal reasons for favouring unionization expressed as dissatisfaction with pay, conditions of service and military status.

Given that this is a valid conclusion, then the critical issue which has to be considered is whether unionization is inevitable because it is the only way in which such dissatisfaction can be countered. Here, European experience suggests that alternative solutions may be a more effective means of meeting military demands. It has already been suggested that in West Germany the linking of military pay and conditions of service to those enjoyed by the Civil Service has done much to eliminate a source of relative deprivation within the armed forces. The British example provides evidence which in a sense confirms this. Here, a sense of relative deprivation is exacerbated by a situation in which the recommendations of established mechanisms to ensure pay comparability are apparently ignored by the political power. What this has resulted in is a notable increase in the number of skilled men and women requesting premature voluntary release (PVR) from the armed forces because of dissatisfaction with pay. As the 1979 Statement on the Defence Estimates comments : [28]

> While, therefore, the continued outflow of trained men
> during the year remains disquieting, the Government
> hopes that, as pay is restored to comparability, the
> normal pattern of outflow will be resumed. It is,
> however, too soon to assess the future trend.

The restoration of pay comparability, therefore, though the mechanism of the Armed Forces Pay Review Board may thus eliminate that cause of relative deprivation which has encouraged withdrawal from the organization. Concomitantly, it may lessen the embryonic demand within the British armed forces for the establishment of some form of group representation.

In a similar fashion, the demand for improved grievance
procedures can be met through the establishment, as in West Germany,
of an independent count of last resort. The setting up of a military
'ombudsman' is thus one alternative strategy which may eradicate a
source of dissatisfaction among members of the armed forces. Clearly,
it is not the only solution. Improved manpower management may equally
do much to meet individual demands. As Levitan and Alderman point
out : [29]

> The military is a fairly rigorous employer in its
> screening and separation practices and certainly
> in its on-the-job discipline. Whether restrictions
> can be eased without an undue loss of military
> capability is certainly worth exploring if greater
> consideration would be given to the rights of
> individuals. In peacetime, the military should
> strive to do no less than private employers in
> respecting the dignity and freedom of its personnel.

A major problem which has to be faced, however, is that radical
management practices may be difficult to implement if there is a
preference for rigid adherence to tradition and in uncompromising
opposition to change. It is where such a preference is implemented,
that we then encounter an increasing demand for unionization as a means
of improving existing procedures and practices.

The demand for an enhanced military status is more difficult to
satisfy. The issues of centrality and power sharing are complex, but
what is perhaps clear is that there is very little evidence to suggest that
the creation of a system of group representation improves to any great
extent such status. Indeed, as has been pointed out, such unionization
may be dysfunctional in that it depresses rather than enhances the status
of armed forces. But to evaluate this, and indeed to look more critically
at all aspects of the mood and motive to unionize, it is necessary to
consider further European practice. Forms of group representation
have been set up in a number of national armed forces and we have to
analyze their form and function before any conclusion can be reached
about their efficacy or their relevance as analogues.

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